Shoring Up Foundations 163of political liberalism is to uncover the conditions of the possibility of a reasonable
public basis of justification on fundamental political questions’ (Rawls 1993: xix).
The argument is recognizably transcendental. The need is to set forth the content
of these ‘conditions of possibility’ for a liberal society. This is a constrained view
of theory, which ‘indicates that the principles and ideals of the political conception
are based on principles of practical reason in union with conceptions of society and
persons, themselves conceptions of practical reason. These conceptions specify the
framework within which principles of practical reason are applied’ (Rawls 1993: xx).
The principles of political justice are, thus, the result of political constructivism, in
which rational persons, subject to reasonable conditions, adopt principles to regu-
late the basic structure of society. Thus, ‘when citizens share a reasonable political
conception of justice, they have a basis on which public discussion of fundamental
political questions can proceed and be reasonably decided’ (Rawls 1993: xix). Within
liberal democratic societies we assume citizens are free and equal. We also assume
that they have capacities for reason and morality. The idea of citizens, conceived in
this way, is an intuitive idea embedded in liberal public culture (Rawls in Strong (ed.)
1992: 104).
Why does Rawls adopt this more pessimistic fearful reading of liberalism? The
answer to this lies in his account of the origin of pluralism. Rawls offers a brief
historical outline of the problem. Essentially, he thinks that early Greek societies
did not have our predicament of pluralism (a predicament which actually generates
political philosophy for Rawls). Greek religions were civic and collective. There was no
sense to individualized salvation or interests. Even within later Greek thought, when
philosophy became the exercise of free disciplined reason, reasoning took place largely
within the civic domain of the polis (Rawls 1993: xxi–xxii). For Rawls, Christianity,
on the other hand, unlike the older civic religion, tended to be authoritarian and
politically absolutist. It was often focused, in a potentially uncivic manner, on personal
or individual salvation. It was not directly concerned with unity in the community. It
was doctrinal and premised on the idea that people must believe the creedal structure.
Priests played a key role as authoritative mediators with God. Finally, Christianity was
an intrinsically expansionist religion, recognizing no territorial limits.
For Rawls, the Reformation added a crucial dimension to the monistic vision
of late medieval Christianity. The authoritarian, doctrinal, expansionist aspects of
Christianity fragmented. Each Reformation sect nowknewthe truth. Believers were
not in any doubt about the highest good, but they were divided. Persecution was one
obvious path to pursue. However, in many situations this was not practical, especially
for religious minorities. For Rawls, this basic pluralism of belief created the need
for political liberalism. Although many Christians were in despair over such an idea,
Rawls adds that, ‘to see reasonable pluralism as a disaster is to see the exercise of reason
under condition of freedom itself as a disaster. Indeed, the sources of liberal constitu-
tionalism came as a discovery of a new social possibility: the possibility of a reasonably
harmonious and stable pluralist society’ (Rawls 1993: xxiv–xxv). Thus, Rawls remarks
unequivocally, ‘the historical origin of political liberalism...is the Reformation and
its aftermath’ (Larmore 1990: 339; Rawls 1993: xxiv). Political liberalism, qua Shklar,