Shoring Up Foundations 165so at a cost—for example,—relegating reason from the religious and metaphysics
sphere. In this context, Rawls’ judgements about metaphysical, theological, moral, or
general comprehensive doctrines become more understandable. He is even that bit
more pessimistic than Kantians earlier in the twentieth century about metaphysics.
Furthermore, his response to the Reformation fits into a broader philosophical debate.
We should not be misled by the idea that Rawls’ response to metaphysics is simply
a way of coping with modern pluralism or multiculturalism. Rawls views multi-
culturalism, and the like, in the same manner as he views Reformation sectarianism,
both exhibit a diversity of metaphysical positions (and one might add, conventional
structures), which areunresolvableby Kantian reason. Multicultural pluralism is a
living body of antinomies. Given Rawls’ neo-Kantianism, it is not surprising that
he should express disquiet with any metaphysical conception of justice. For Rawls,
there is a metaphysical tradition, including Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas and,
more recently, embracing J. S. Mill, and even Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz. This
tradition is committed to a rational foundational good. Such theories also tend to be
teleological. Institutions are thus just in so far as they promote this good. Rawls sees
this as the dominant tradition in moral philosophy. In response, he adopts a form of
modified Kantian constructivism, trying to avoid the question of metaphysical truth
in order to accommodate pluralism.
Political values, like justice, are thus premised upon ‘intuitive ideas that are
embedded in the political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime’. The
conventional loyalties, which citizens regard as central to their identity, are part of
what Rawls calls our ‘non-public identity’. They may shape our lives, but humans
can convert. The non-public identity then changes, but the public (or political)
identity remains. Citizens in democratic societies think of themselves in a particu-
lar way. It is aconditionof their activity. They regard themselves as being able to
take responsibility for their lives. These ideas are all embedded in political liberalism.
One can accept these notions without necessarily being committed to any compre-
hensive metaphysical or foundational liberalism. Thus, the core of Rawls’ argument
is that comprehensive foundational metaphysics is not a good ground for unifying
society—‘philosophy as the search for truth about an independent metaphysical and
moral order cannot, I believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political
conception of justice’ (Rawls in Strong (ed.) 1992: 109–11).
Rawls does though have a problem here. The distinction between politics and
metaphysics is central. Yet, he openly admits that there is no commonly accepted
understanding of metaphysics. He also agrees that one could unwittingly presuppose
a metaphysics. He comments that ‘it is not enough simply to disavow reliance upon
metaphysical doctrines, for despite one’s intent they may still be involved’. He con-
tinues that, ‘To rebut claims of this nature requires discussing them in detail and
showing that they have no foothold.’ This is a fairly significant charge, but Rawls
concludes, ‘I cannot do that here’ (Rawls 1993: 29). Despite this avowal, Rawls
does attempt an answer of sorts. He is prepared to admit that there may be latent
metaphysical belief in his views of liberalism and citizenship. For example, to try to
categorically do without a metaphysical doctrine may be to presuppose one. Rawls