The Nature of Political Theory

166 The Nature of Political Theory

also suggests that the conception of persons, as the basic units of deliberation and
responsibility, may presuppose certain metaphysical ideas. Rawls remarks, ‘I should
not want to deny these claims’. Nonetheless, he still insists that, as regards political lib-
eralism, ‘no particular metaphysical doctrines about the nature of persons, distinctive
and opposed to other metaphysical doctrines, appears among its premises or seems
required by its argument’. He continues, ‘If metaphysical presuppositions are involved,
perhaps they are so general that they would not distinguish between the metaphysical
views—Cartesian, Leibnizian, or Kantian; realist, idealist or materialist—with which
philosophy has traditionally been concerned. In this case they would not appear to
be relevant for the structure and content of a political conception of justice one way
or the other’ (Rawls 1993: 29, n.31).
There is something rather disingenuous in Rawls’ position. First, Rawls admits
that there is no common understanding of metaphysics. It is also not at all clear
what Rawls himself means by it, although it looks like a more general Kantian mis-
trust. The term ‘metaphysics’ seems, in fact, gradually less in evidence as Rawls
has developed his ideas on political liberalism, maybe this is not wholly fortuitous.
Second, Rawls does hint at some meanings to the term. It can imply any funda-
mental assumption we make, almost in the Collingwoodian sense of an absolute
presupposition. Absolute presupposition arises where no conception of truth or fals-
ity is involved, rather, they are absolutely presupposed and no prior questions arise
concerning them. Thus, to deny metaphysics absolutely is, paradoxically, to affirm
metaphysics.^20 Third, Rawls suggests that conceptions of the ‘rational person’ might
be considered metaphysical in character. This is a more substantive presupposition.
Rawls oddly does not deny the possibility of the second and third ideas. Yet, he
also contends that his theory does not consciously pursue any metaphysical thesis.
Further, if there are metaphysical themes in his work (which he admits is possible),
they are so general as to be irrelevant to his theory. How one reconciles these points
is left open.
Rawls’ answers here are clearly unsatisfactory. Because foundational metaphysical
ideas are not fully articulated by a thinker does not lessen the significant point that
there are foundational metaphysical premises. This ‘inner citadel’ of the argument
is often its most significant aspect. In fact, Rawls, unexpectedly, admits that thereis
such a metaphysical premise to his political liberalism, but it remains unarticulated.
Rawls suggests it is irrelevant. But why does deep-rooted and unarticulated entail
irrelevance? Rawls assures his readers that the political notion of the rational person
(andcitizen), andtheassumptionswemakeaboutthemoralpowersofthatperson, are
already deeply embedded in the public reason and public culture of liberal democratic
societies. This might be seen as the implicit communitarian thesis in Rawls’ argument.
Yet, the fact that he assumes persons are like thisandthat he assumes such ideas are
embedded, we are to believe, has nothing to do with metaphysics. His contention
appears to be that he is offering an empirical account of what is the case. Yet, clearly,
there is nothing remotely empirical about such claims. Rather, we might redescribe
Rawls’ ideas as plausible metaphysical assumptions about human beings and their
relation to society. Metaphysics is not about blind prejudice, it rather refers to the