The Nature of Political Theory

168 The Nature of Political Theory

many apparent ‘communities’ or particular political orders. As Charles Larmore puts
it, such norms have been ‘a part of Western moral thought for centuries’ (Larmore
1990: 354). Political liberalism is not just concerned with amodus vivendi. In many
communities, the values of liberalism are considered to be right or correct. They
are not simply the result of living in the West, they rather follow frombelievingin
oneself in a particular way—as free and equal. Thus, we do not draw them from our
culture, but, conversely, we assume them immanently byengagingin practices, such
as rational dialogue and equal respect. Norms of equal respect and rational dialogue
are central to Western culture, therefore we have to take on board the values implicit
within them.
For Larmore, however, Rawls, in one reading, appears to have partly retreated
from this universal connectedness. In one sense, as Rawls intimates, even in his
earlier work, his theory does not argue for, or assume, any universal claim. Thus
the original position, for example, can just be considered a ‘device of representation’.
However, Larmore is, at the same time, not convinced that Rawls wants to suggest a
total loss of universal truth. If Rawls says such values are not universally true, he does
not mean, for Larmore, that he does not believe them to be correct. Rather, Rawls
wants to dissociate his argument from metaphysics—as outlined above. The notion
oftruthhe resists is thus a very particular one, namely, ‘implying the existence of an
independent order of moral facts’. For Larmore, Rawls appears to employ this weaker
notion of truth. It is basically equivalent to rational acceptability (Larmore 1990: 355).
The fine line walked by political liberalism here (which is exactly the same precarious
line walked by all weaker variants of communitarianism), concerns the question: how
do we relate and compare the purportedly ‘correct’ conventions of liberal democratic
societies with the conventions of other societies, specifically where members of those
other societies do not believe in ‘our’ conventions? Larmore quite candidly admits
here that he has ‘no ready answer’. The key danger though is ‘making liberalism yet
another controversial and partisan vision of the good life’ (Larmore 1990: 357). In
place of being a latent resolution, political liberalism turns into part of the dilemma.
This is not an unknown conundrum in conventionalist argument.
One other issue, which will be taken up in later chapters, is the point that
communitarianism (as a characteristic expression of late twentieth century conven-
tionalism) remains theoretically weak on a range of conceptual issues. It does not
have the theoretical sophistication or subtlety of Oakeshott’s thought. There is, for
example, very little clear thinking about the nature or character of community itself. It
is also not clear whether communities coincide, overlap, or internally conflict within
juridical states. The relation between the state and community remains profoundly
under-theorized. Further, communities themselves can be internally and quite fiercely
divided. What is the relation between the human self and the diversity of groupings
through which it subsists? The communitarian picture on such issues is hesitant and
often muddled. Communitarians—despite the central role played by groups—often
seem oblivious to the complexity, hazards, and awkward character of group or associ-
ational life. Apart from Walzer’s work on complex communities and complex equality,