New Conventions for Old 179of diverse imperfect ways of life or communities. Third, although there is recognition
of contingency, diversity and imperfection, nonetheless, Aristotle also suggests that
there are forms of character, conduct, and social existence, which are more condu-
cive to or congruent with human flourishing. For Martha Nussbaum, for example,
Aristotelianism is therefore committed to ‘the realization of a good human life’, yet
the manner in which this realization can be achieved is subject to luck. The good is
fragile and can easily be undermined or destroyed by circumstances (see Nussbaum
1986: 3).
The second main theme of this section concerns the critique of liberalism, com-
munitarianism, and nationalism. Much of the initial critique of liberalism is shared
with both communitarianism and nationalism. Primarily liberalism is seen as too
focused on the individual, at the expense of community. One implication of the lib-
eral individualist perspective is that individuals are seen to be autonomously forming
their own ways of life, that is, liberals regularly daydream about individuals consti-
tuting themselves. For neo-Aristotelians, most individuals are, in fact,pre-socialized
into given functional social, moral, and political roles. Choice does not usually come
into the equation for the majority of human beings. Further, reason (qua liberalism)
cannot simply construct a way of life at will. Practical reason is rather a know-
ing where to go next, within an already existing tradition. Any search for a wholly
external or independent reasonable foundation is, for neo-Aristotelianism, bound to
be misconceived. Community is prior to the individual. Liberalism, without its tacit
and unspoken philosophical anthropology, would be inert in relation to practical
dilemmas. For neo-Aristotelians, liberalism also appears unable to function with the
idea of its own inevitable historical and sociological contingency. Further, the liberal
perspective is seen to foster the idea that individuals confer values on the world. Neo-
Aristotelians deny this, seeing reality as something, which is prior to and recognized
by individuals. The community is already a potential repository of values. Another
implication of the liberal position is the obsessive focus on individual rights, which
often encourages an overly adversarial and self-assertive way of life, which undermines
communities. Rights, in the neo-Aristotelian perspective, are rooted in a community
and are viewed largely as conditions of flourishing. However, for most contemporary
neo-Aristotelians the above criticisms do not entail a complete rejection of liberalism.
Most—but definitely not all—believe that a neo-Aristotelian ethos can be blended
with a reformed or adjusted understanding of liberalism (see Beiner 1992: 9; Salkever
1990; Yack 1993; Nussbaum 1990).
However, one should not jump to the conclusion from the above analysis, that
neo-Aristotelianism is simply a variant on communitarianism. Far from it. For
neo-Aristotelians, whereas liberalism is committed to an implausible and abstract
individualism, communitarians, in general, are seen to be overly committed to an
implausible and abstracted conception of the community. Although communitari-
ans focus correctly on the key role of community, it is still a too abstracted, thin,
romanticized, and evaluative conception. Neo-Aristotelians tend to use the term
community in a more generic descriptive, almost sociological, sense. Communit-
arians thus often conflate community and communitarianism, that is an evaluative,