The Nature of Political Theory

180 The Nature of Political Theory

consensual, and idealized idea with a more contingent, generic, potentially internally
divisive, and realist conception. In other words, for neo-Aristotelians, individuals are
constituted, shaped, or socialized by communities. However, they do not necessarily
idealize or valorize communityper se. Community isnotabout intense belonging or
moral rectitude (see Yack 1993: 26). All kinds of community are therefore of interest
to neo-Aristotelianism, the majority of which are contingent, imperfect, and lacking
in social harmony. Communitarians, although seeing community as a good, fail to
identify and analyse the political and social processes of communities in practice.
The problem, for neo-Aristotelians, is that modern communitarianism is largely a
contingent reaction to the individualism of liberal justice theory and contractarian-
ism. In trying, polemically, to adjust political theory away from individualism, it
fails to probe the alternative—community. It is also worth noting here that most neo-
Aristotelians are also critical of both the civic republican and nationalist alternative on
similar grounds. That is republicans tend to idealize the ‘republic’ and nationalists the
‘national community’. It is therefore contended that neo-Aristotelianism should be
kept distinct from communitarianism, republicanism, and nationalism (see Salkever
1990: 81; Beiner 1992: 123; Yack 1993: 62).
The third main issue of this section concerns the different strands of neo-
Aristotelian argument. Up to now the continuity of neo-Aristotelianism has been
emphasized. However, it is clear from even the most cursory reading of their writings,
that there are marked internal divisions, particularly over issues such as teleology, the
metaphysical biology underpinning Aristotle’s thought, the nature of the ideal com-
munity and the linkage with communitarianism. Two strands of twentieth century
neo-Aristotelianism stand out. These can be seen as negative and positive readings.
Both forms stress the acceptance of contingency and imperfection. However, the
positive reading lays more stress on an achievable ideal form of social existence,
which is grounded on practical reason and sound character. This view identifies a
definite doctrinal component to Aristotelianism. The negative reading stresses that
neo-Aristotelianism has no universally applicable ideal and thus plays upon realism
and contingency.
The positive reading of neo-Aristotelianism sees a definite, if qualified, notion of
the good. One of the most explicit developments of this positive argument can be
found in Martha Nussbaum’s writings. She suggests that the nearest approximation
to neo-Aristotelian moral and political ideals is, quite literally, twentieth century
social democracy. In articulating her view, she tries to steer a course between, on the
one hand, a thick perfectionist and paternalistic notion of the good, which liberal
pluralists abhor, and, on the other hand, a thin liberal foundational good, which does
little or no justice to the particular material, conventional, and empirical realities
underpinning human functioning. In other words, she tries to forge a middle path
(or third way) between pluralism and monism, universalism and particularism, and
between the stability of values and the fact of social contingency. This vision of neo-
Aristotelianism acknowledges a difference in values, but still contends that we have a
sharedmoral quest—that is to ‘live well’ and ‘flourish’. Her solution to the dilemma
of uniting the universal and particular is the idea of a ‘thick vague’ conception of both