New Conventions for Old 181human beings and the good. She sees this as doing justice to both liberal anxieties
concerning paternalism and a rich sense of communal particularism. The good is thick
and ‘intercultural’, but it is also vague, consequently allowing plurality and difference.
There is, therefore, for Nussbaum, an illusory tension between liberal freedom and the
perfectionist value of human well being (see Nussbaum 1990: 238–9). Like most mid
to late twentieth-century political theorists, neo-Aristotelians, such as Nussbaum,
want a firm or thick foundation—something which is shared by humanity—which
nonetheless avoids any taint of metaphysics.
The thick vague good is embodied in the claim that all humans wish to live well or
flourish. Nussbaum spells out this good in terms of a common sensitivity to the needs
of the body, shared sensations of pleasure and pain, the desire for understanding, the
use of practical reason, the needs for affiliation with other human beings, a common
awareness of infant development and humour. To flourish, in these dimensions,
constitutes basic human happiness, but such happiness is not necessarily focused on
the acceptance of one uniform belief system. However, one can still describe happiness
as integral to the teleology of human nature. The ground for human flourishing is
broad (covering humanity in general), but also deep, insofar as it addresses very basic
requirements of human functioning; or, as Nussbaum puts it, it focuses on the ‘totality
of the functionings that constitute the good human life’ (Nussbaum 1990: 209). For
Nussbaum, ‘there is just human life as it is lived. But in life as it is lived, we do find a
family of experiences, clustering around certain focuses, which can provide reasonable
starting points for cross-cultural reflection’ (Nussbaum 1993: 265). For Nussbaum,
therefore, despite the awareness and sensitivity to local conventional belief, there is
still ‘a single objective account of the human good, or human flourishing’ which is
not justified by an appeal to local or communal traditions (Nussbaum 1993: 243).
For Nussbaum there is no contradiction in the above claim. The aims of local
conventional awareness and transcultural justification are compatible. The basic
argument here is that a ‘sphere of experience’ or ‘grounding experience’—relating
to one’s bodily needs, death, the development of children or practical reason, and the
like—is universal. However, the particular nature of the choices one makes within
that ‘grounding experience’ relate to differing conventional beliefs. Ethical theory
is committed to searching for the best approximation of value to that ‘grounding
experience’ (Nussbaum 1993: 247). A virtue, in any human being, is something which
contributes to human flourishing and thus happiness. Virtues are, in this vague sense,
unified. Various conventional cultures will give competing answers to the issue of the
grounding experience. To exercise virtues requires judgement and prudence. This
constitutes the basis to character. Character implies prudence and good judgement in
practical situations. Nussbaum suggests that certain responses, types of character, or
judgements might approximate more closely to the ‘grounding experiences’ and thus
enhance human happiness.^9
Politics, in this positive neo-Aristotelian scenario, is concerned primarily with
meeting the basic conditions for human flourishing, outlined above. The implica-
tion is that neo-Aristotelianism implies some form of ideal social democratic welfare
state, equivalent to those found in late twentieth century Scandinavia. This is not, for