The Nature of Political Theory

182 The Nature of Political Theory

Nussbaum, a residual or minimalist welfarism, it is rather ‘a comprehensive support
scheme for the functioning of all citizens over a complete life’ (Nussbaum 1990:
228). The ‘thick vague’ idea (which is universal) underpins the comprehensive wel-
fare vision. This vision entails a detailed sensitivity to the material, educational, and
institutional conditions of human flourishing. In this context, employment condi-
tions, property, rights, land allocation, education, and political participation support
human functioning and flourishing and need to be addressed. There is, as Nussbaum
puts it, a ‘rich neediness’ in humans, which has to be taken on board. Thus, neo-
Aristotelianism, in cultivating virtue and the variety of human excellences, must also
focus on the complex material, social, and educational conditions, which underpin
the flourishing of human beings.
However, there is also a more negative perspective on Aristotle. This basically takes
two forms. Both express discomfort with any notion of teleology. Both feel uneasy
with the attempt to derive a universal or thick conception of the good; such an idea is
seen to be impossible in the present modern era. The emphasis on Aristotle thus falls
on his realism, conventionalism, and difference. The first form stresses what might
loosely be called a hermeneutic dimension. In this reading neo-Aristotelianism is not
something, which offers any substantive or thick good. It is not foundational in the
sense of other forms of political theory. Rather, it is a way of thinking about and
interpreting existing values and assessing their role and function. The second view
does, however, settle upon neo-Aristotelianism as providing a rich good. But, it is
nota universal good, conversely, it is a highly heterogeneous particularist alternative.
The stress therefore falls away from Nussbaum’s universal ‘grounding experiences’
towards conventional contingencies. The latter view links neo-Aristotelianism with a
version of communitarianism.
The first more hermeneutic view emphasizes Aristotle’s realistic awareness of con-
tingency, variety, and difference. The good life in Aristotle is not about rich or thick
ideals. Moral and political life is always both extremely fragile and internally diverse.
Aristotle is notable, in this reading, for having drawn attention to the tense and
imperfect social structures and contingencies within which we try to exercise moral
and political beliefs. Bernard Yack, for example, suggests that the bulk of Aristotle’s
moral and political reflections are tied to his explanation of the ordinary and every-
day lives and struggles of humanity. It is a mistaken interpretation of his work to
try to discover some kind of universal foundational or universal good in his work.
Yack comments, ‘Unlike most of Aristotle’s contemporary admirers, I do not turn
to his work in the hope of finding the objective foundation for our moral and polit-
ical commitments...I fully accept that most of us will continue to seek beyond
Aristotelian ideas in order to identify and justify our moral and political commit-
ments’ (Yack 1993: 283). In this view, too much attention is given to the notion
of an ideal form of social existence. Thus, Yack does not want to see Aristotle as a
‘teleological moralist’ promoting some kind of definite moral ideal. Politics is rather
a ‘means through which we identify the changing and often conflicting standards’
(Yack 1993: 132). For Yack, Nussbaum’s reading of Aristotle—that is identifying the
nature of the good for human beings—is a misinterpretation. He contends that it is