New Conventions for Old 193arbitrariness—the tyranny of the majority. Thus, as Pettit concludes, ‘so much for
the populist alternative to republicanism’ (Pettit 1997: 8).
There are a number of points here. It is not clear that populism, conceptually
and historically, does directly imply participatory democracy (participatory demo-
cracy itself is also an internally complex entity). Favouring the opinions of ordinary
people, or focusing on the interests and tradition of the mass of small property owners
(Poujadism or Peronism)—both possible readings of populism—do not necessarily
entail, in any way, participatory democracy. Dictatorship is, for example, compatible
with populism. Further, populism—whatever it means—does not haveanyneces-
sary conceptual links with communitarianism.^20 Communitarianism also hasno
necessary conceptual links with democracy in general, let alone direct democracy
in particular. Many contemporary Asian states, for example Singapore, who have
made a lot of assertive and loud communitarian noises in the last decade, have non-
etheless been deeply sceptical about all but the most constrained democratic practices.
We now have terms like ‘illiberal democracy’ being used appraisively in South East
Asia. Finally, to associate Arendt with an open avowal of communitarianism, pop-
ulism, and explicit (unqualified) direct democracy, is not just misplaced, but just
very odd. Pettit is though correct on Arendt’s interest in direct democracy. As one
commentator has noted, Arendt had an evident preference ‘for small-scale repub-
lican forms like the revolutionary councils and town-hall meetings over large scale,
impersonal...representative and bureaucratic institutions’ (Hansen 1993: 220). It is
worth grasping here, though, exactly why Arendt favoured this idea, since it will also
provide an understanding of her conception of republicanism in terms of the value
she undoubtedly saw in the ‘public thing’.
One of the standard criticisms of Arendt relates to her interest in the ancient form
of polis and republic, and the constraining effect that it has on her thought. It is
important to take note here of the fact that this kind of accusation isalsodirected at
many forms of republicanism.^21 In the case of Arendt, she uses the ancient polis as
more of a paradigm or ‘ideal type’ of a certain kind of political relationship. She was
thus more interested in the manner in which they organized their public and private
worlds. This should not be taken as overt ‘Graecomania’ (see Villa (ed.) 2000: 9; see
also Euben and Taminaux essays in Villa (ed.) 2000: 161, 176). It is impossible, within
the short space available here, to offer anything but the most brief overview of Arendt’s
diverse and complex work. Indeed, the identity and character of her work, are still a
subject of intense scholarly debate. However, it is important here to consider her as
a sophisticated exponent of a form of twentieth century republicanism. The theme
explored here relates to her idea that Greek and Roman conceptions of the state con-
tained a powerful and overt conception of a ‘public realm’, whereas, gradually, states in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have become increasingly fascinated with the
social (something considered an extension of the hierarchical order of the family, that
is,oikoswithdominium).^22 In effect, the social (and economic) are seen to potentially
diminish the public space and the freedom involved with this space. The invasion of
the public world by the social world can, for example, be seen in the development of
the twentieth-century welfare state (see Brunkhorst in Villa (ed.) 2000, 189ff.).