New Conventions for Old 197can therefore expand ‘beyond national boundaries’ (Viroli 1995: 12). In this context,
the conventional republican norms are salvaged for the ‘universal’. This is a common
strategy within conventionalist argument during the late twentieth century. It can,
for example, be found in liberal nationalism, neo-Aristotelianism, and liberal com-
munitarianism. It aims to link conventions with some form of universal immanent
foundation.^25 In consequence, republican patriotism can, on one level, counter the
conventional structures of both nationalistic and communitarian argument, as well
as conservative claims to patriotism. Communitarianism is repudiated particularly
because of its purported focus on positive liberty. This, in some republican writers,
also leads to a suspicion of the ‘apparent’ republicanism of Rousseau and Kant. Com-
munitarianism is also seen to concentrate excessively, in a non-neutral manner, on
communal consensus. The early communitarian writings of Charles Taylor are often
singled out by recent republicans, such as Viroli, Pettit, and Skinner, particularly on
the theme of positive liberty—although John Maynor’s recent work provides a partial
resolution to this problem (Maynor 2003). Taylor’s conception of liberty is seen to
concentrate, like Rousseau, on the positive theme of participatory self-rule, which
is considered alien to republicanism. Communitarians are also seen to lay too much
stress on the conventional character of morality, over-emphasizing local solidarit-
ies. One additional annoyance here for republican writers is that Taylor (amongst
other communitarians such as Michael Sandel) has configured his own position,
occasionally, as a form of communitarian republicanism. He also tends to separate
out communitarian republican patriotism from nationalism in a very similar way to
republican writers such as Viroli.
One problem here is that it is not that obvious who has a genuine entitlement to be
considered republican. It is clear that Pettit, Viroli, Skinner, and others, would clearly
like to exclude the likes of Taylor, Arendt, Rousseau, and possibly even Kant, from
republican ranks. However, it is far from clear that their own claim to the republican
heartland is in any way clearly established. The republican views, for example, of
Pettit and Viroli are markedly different to earlier seventeenth and eighteenth-century
forms, let alone early Roman or medieval forms. There is no one continuous pristine
tradition here, rather multiple strands.
Another more significant criticism though of republicanism comes from critics of
conventionalist argument. In the same way that republicans are critical of nation-
alists and communitarians for over-playing the conventionalist card, so republicans
themselves have also been chided for their over-emphasis on communal consensus.
This is despite the fierce and repetitive claims of recent republicans to be able to
deal both with modern pluralism and conventionalist arguments. Habermas, for
example, in a postconventional mode, has expressed deep unease with the more furt-
ive consensual communal demands of recent republicans. Somewhat incongruously,
he argues that the republican standpoint is, to all intents and purposes, more or less
identical with communitarianism, in laying emphasis on the point that the ‘citizen
must identify himself “patriotically” with his particular form of life’. The communit-
arianandrepublicanconceptionsthereforeimplysomeformof‘sharedconsciousness’
about liberty within an ethical community. Habermas sees a conceptual link here