The Nature of Political Theory

198 The Nature of Political Theory

between republicanism, communitarianism, and nationalism. For Habermas, the
‘classic republican idea of the self-conscious political integration of community of
free and equal persons is evidently too...simple a notion to remain applicable to
modern conditions’. Republicans, for Habermas, are thus similar to communitarians
and nationalists in regarding the citizen as ‘fully integrated’ within a communal iden-
tity, centred on certain values.^26 One of the primary values appealed to by republicans
is a particular conception of liberty, understood via non-domination. This is by no
means a weak, neutral or empty value. For Habermas, it is surreptitiously perfec-
tionist, invasive, and clearly non-neutral. This point would figure even more strongly
for premodern republicanism that was far more openly conventionalist and had very
firm thick consensual conceptions of liberty, amongst other values. This firm sense
of ethical probity in many ways still silently underpins modern republicanism.
Republicans, such as Viroli (although Pettit one suspect would have some reser-
vations here), have responded to Habermas on this issue. The response is utterly
predictable, for example, if you do not feel comfortable arguing with someone, then
absorb them. Thus, Taylor remains outside republicanism and Habermas becomes
an unwitting republican by default. The response, again, is premised on the con-
testable assumption of a consensus on what a pristine republicanism actually looks
like. It is focused on a somewhat idiosyncratic late-twentieth century version, which,
miraculously, has become the very acme of an unbroken tradition going back to the
Roman republic. It may have been partly submerged, historically, a few times, but
it has been rediscovered and revived again in the 1990s. In this view, the focus on
non-dominatory political liberty isnotthe same as demanding a communal con-
sensus. As emphasized above, Taylor cannot be a republican, for Viroli, because he
places the concept of liberty within the context of this communal consensus. Positive
liberty becomes participatory self-rule. However, citizenship is not concerned with
self-rule in the context of an ethical community, conversely, it is the ‘enjoyment and
exercise of civil and political rights as a member of arespublica’ (Viroli 1995: 171,
note 23). Love of country is a love of genuine political liberty. Republican liberty and
democracy do not require ethnocultural supports. They need, conversely, educated
and rational citizens. Viroli suggests that Habermas sees this well enough, and with
some minor adjustments to his notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’, Habermas could
be absorbed into the republican fold. Consequently, the conventional republican
community-based liberty integrates the universal.^27
One deeply ambiguous assumption here is that republicanism—as focused on the
rule of law and liberty as non-domination—does not presuppose any necessary cul-
tural homogeneity. Leaving aside the question as to whether culture can be so easily
bypassed in a state, despite the above avowals, it is clear that there is still a strong
demand for some form of homogenous understanding of liberty amongst citizens.
In addition, those who understand liberty in contrary ways, would not be accept-
able within republican states. Law isnotseen as neutral, conversely, it ought to
embody the means for individuals to exercise genuine political freedom. To accept
basic homogenous claims about liberty and law is the background assumption, which
enables citizens toactuallyengage in the practices of citizenship, ethics, and political