The Nature of Political Theory

208 The Nature of Political Theory

and cultures. Thus, the internal logic of conventional argument—even apart from
disagreements about the nature of fundamental conventions—generates a growing
conceptual diversity of meanings. It is the logic of this latter position that I now wish
to examine.
Consequently the aim of this chapter is to pursue the logic of the conventionalist
argument several steps beyond Part Three. The basic argument made in this chapter
is that conventionalism does not stop at the level of the nation, ethnos, or com-
munity. The point here is that every such traditional community, nation, or ethnos
is constituted by multiple sub-communities, sub-ethnie, and sub-cultures. Thus, the
argument about conventions and meanings is pushed several steps backwards. This
point simply follows logically from the emphasis on conventionalism. In other words,
the original conventionalisms, which shored up the argument for foundationalism
by nationhood, ethos, or community, areallflawed foundations. To concentrate
on the conventional medium is always to invite further subdivisions, since it is an
empirical fact that most societies do actually contain multiple subgroup conventions.
Therefore, the basic thesis of this chapter will be that in using conventionalism, as the
modus operandifor establishing certain foundational goods, those very foundations
become, in turn, further segmentalized. This segmentation process does overlap with
earlier debates—however, in the present account, they are viewed through the themes
of liberal pluralism, multiculturalism, and difference theory. Each of these contains
further complex subdivisions.
One key assumption underpinning this chapter is that there is a resonance between
the concepts of liberal pluralism, multiculturalism, and difference. Each of these terms
has figured prominently in relatively discrete bodies of literature over the last few
decades. Further, each concept also has a distinct history, however, they all deal with a
similar range of problems. The root problem behind them all is the idea that virtually
all societies contain internal diversity—in terms of values and cultures—and that
such diversity has to be dealt with, or coped with, in some manner. In fact, virtually
all societies have experienced some internal diversity from the early Greek polis to
the present day (see Grillo 1998). Social, moral, political, and cultural diversities have
not just been invented. However, the idea of such internal diversity took on a much
higher intellectual profile during the last two decades of the twentieth century. What
is relatively novel is the intensity of the intellectual focus in recent political theory.
Why has the recent interest in pluralism and diversity arisen? Briefly, the immedi-
ate background reasons for this lie in the last two decades of the twentieth century,
namely, the end of the cold war, the opening up of markets and societies, considerable
growth of international population migration, continuous refugee crises, accelera-
tion of trade, vastly-expanded news media, communication, and capital flows across
the globe. This complex process has created high levels of political and economic
awareness, as well as deep anxiety and sense of social and personal instability and dis-
location. One way to both explain and cope with this anxiety has been to re-emphasize
older forms of local idiosyncratic attachment, thus the focus on national, cultural,
ethnic, or religious affiliations. The fortuitous combination of globalizing forces, the
accelerated mixing of populations, together with the renewed interest in ethnicity and