The Nature of Political Theory

214 The Nature of Political Theory

The second broad position of liberal pluralism still insists upon the universal
applicability of liberal reason and liberal goods. However, unlike the neutralist posi-
tion, it insists upon the open and unashamed promotion of liberal goods and liberal
reason. Thus, William Galston, for example, claiming to be a committed universal-
ist liberal, goes out of his way to deny the neutrality claim, asserting that liberals
should rather, unashamedly, affirm a liberal universalist perfectionism (see Galston
1991). Galston bewails (what he considers) Rawls’ abandonment of comprehensive
metaphysical resources and accuses him of still being caught in a dangerously one-
sided view of the liberal tradition. Adopting the thick and thin metaphor, favoured
in contemporary political theory, if Rawls thickened out slightly with his later ‘polit-
ical liberalism’, then Galston becomes happily obese (although with a very different
perspective to political liberalism). The root of Galston’s substantive good(s) is what
he disarmingly calls, ‘a native element of American culture’ (see Galston 1991: 8,
17).^7 Liberalism miraculously embodies these ‘native’ components. Consequently,
Galston repudiates the idea of neutrality for the sake of a thickened up, perfectionist,
ethical liberalism, asserted forcefully through the educational curriculum and state
action. This might therefore be entitled auniversal perfectionistliberalism. In other
words, liberal goods are seen to be morally preferable. Galston in fact identifies vari-
ous generic elements, which are seen as definitely constitutive of the good life of all
human beings. In many ways, this conception of liberalism is also characteristic of
some earlier expressions of nineteenth century liberalism in, for example, J. S. Mill
or T. H. Green. The room for pluralism in this framework is curtailed, except that
a number of groups and individuals will be allowed to flourish,as long asthey do
not undermine general liberal purposes. Liberalism therefore circumscribes diversity
through perfectionism. But, for Galston, liberals should not be worried about this,
since its own aims are clearly the most worthwhile and universal.
The third liberal perspective emphasizes rights, justice, and neutrality, again, but
in a more hesitant negative format. In the mind of its proponents, the origins of this
argument go back to the complex sixteenth and seventeenth century constitutional
arguments on how to deal with religious civil war. The later John Rawls—of polit-
ical liberalism—adopts a variant of this reading (as discussed in Part Three). Rawls’
main problem, therefore, is not freedom,per se, but the containment and manage-
ment of pluralism. Rawls’ reasonable pluralism is one where citizens, accepting the
basic structures of a liberal democratic constitutional state, nonetheless diverge on
substantive questions of the good. Rawls thinks this divergence inevitable but also
deeply worrying. Reason does not unify in any substantive way. Rawls’ later vision
of liberalism (qua diverse cultures) is more minimalist and constrained, certainly
in comparison to Brian Barry’s position. Political liberalism takes the pluralism of
groups for granted, but regarded as unavoidable problems. The task of political lib-
eralism is then to work out a conception of justice for a constitutional democratic
regime embodying, if possible, a reasonable pluralism. The neutrality of public reason
is maintained. However, Rawlsneitherseeks a perfectionist foundation,norany overt
universalist claims. Universality is sidelined, and in its place is a tacit admittal of a
conventionalist particularist framework. For Rawls the ‘aim of political liberalism is