Segmented Foundations and Pluralism 215to uncover the conditions of the possibility of a reasonable public basis of justification
on fundamental political questions’ (Rawls 1993: xix). The whole liberal enterprise,
vis-à-vispluralism, can thus be seen as a form ofparticularist neutrality. The problem-
atic element of pluralism is largely groups (taken in a broad sense), not individuals.
However, one suspects that no political liberals would accept the methodological col-
lectivism of certain group-based arguments. In this sense, although the individual
fades in political liberalism, the ‘group concept’ never attains any clear shape either.
Another variation on the ‘particularist neutrality’ thesis is more self-consciously
concerned with the immediate personal and public tragedy which faces us with cul-
tural diversity. This is the counter-Enlightenment liberalism of Isaiah Berlin, which,
consciously or not, contrasts itself to the more effusive confidence of Enlightenment
liberalism. As Berlin stated, ‘if, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of
them are in principles compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict—
and of tragedy—can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or
social’ (Berlin 1997, 239). Society is punctuated by numerous opposing values and
cultures, which cannot be amicably combined in an individual life or society. There
is thus no uniquely right solution. As Berlin put it, ‘forms of life differ. Ends, moral
principles, are many’ (Berlin quoted in Ignatieff 1998: 285). Thinkers such as Stuart
Hampshire and Bernard Williams link up with this perspective, arguing that there are,
in effect, no single truths in morality. No ultimate commensurability is ever possible.
This conception of liberal value pluralism thus emphasizes the tragic incompatibility
and contingency of values.
Berlin is though a more difficult figure to place. He was undoubtedly sympath-
etic to the legal and political ideas underpinning the first two accounts of liberal
pluralism. In fact, many have wanted to place him quite squarely in this position.
His basic views appear more in tune with an orthodox liberal individualism. In
this sense, the pluralism referred to in Berlin’s writings is a plurality of individuals.
However, Berlin’s intrinsic difficulty here is his deep underlying admiration for the
likes of Gottfried Herder, and the more general ‘culturalist’, counter-Enlightenment,
group-based standpoint in politics. This makes him a more sympathetic, if indecisive,
observer of cultural pluralism, whilst at the same time being painfully aware of the
tragic problems this gives rise to in practice. In consequence of this latter view, some
have even categorized Berlin as a ‘cultural difference’ theorist manqué.
Multicultural Pluralism
The fourth perspective on liberal pluralism moves the argument into a different
sphere.^8 Although there are fairly innocuous formulations of multiculturalism within
the first three formulations of liberal pluralism, the stronger statements on multicul-
turalism begin with the fourth dimension. One definite intellectual shift to be found
in multicultural pluralism, as distinct from the bulk of earlier liberal pluralism, is that
the prefix ‘multi’ conventionally applies largely to groups, not individuals. Because
of the emphasis on groups, as opposed to individuals, multicultural pluralism often