The Nature of Political Theory

216 The Nature of Political Theory

finds itself in direct conflict with certain liberal pluralists. In broad overview, there-
fore, multicultural pluralism views society as composed of groups, each constituted
by their own culture. Culture refers very loosely to the beliefs, symbols, and values
of the group. However, what a group is and whether it qualifies for a culture, and, in
addition, what a culture is, remain as open and unresolved questions.
Multiculturalism,per se, is seen as a relatively novel phenomenon by most com-
mentators, although it has obvious antecedents in older political organizations, such
as empires.^9 Yet, the serious political theory focus on multiculturalism developed
comparatively recently, initially in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand from the
1970s, and then migrated to the United States and European politics in the sub-
sequent two decades.^10 In each case, the idea of multiculturalism usually figures as a
more accidental response to circumstances of, for example, increasing immigration
or cultural assertiveness. In most states it is still a seriously contested idea in the public
policy forum.
Before discussing liberal multiculturalism, it is important to note that there are dif-
ferent forms of multiculturalism. A common distinction is between thinner and more
robust forms (Miller 1995: 133; Shachar 2000: 67–8, Baumeister 2000; Parekh 2001;
Shachar 2002). The thinner form is essentially developed in liberal multiculturalism.
The significant change to more traditional liberal pluralist argument is that the vital
‘particle of difference’ becomes the group (or the individual considered primarily in
relation to the group). For example, Shachar considers Kymlicka as an exponent of this
thinner liberal multiculturalism.^11 The present discussion considers two arguments:
liberal multicultural pluralism and communitarian multicultural pluralism. The real
difference between these latter two can be gauged in terms of just how seriously they
take the ontology of groups.
Liberal multicultural pluralism can be regarded as the fourth variant on liberal
pluralism. It tries to forge a middle path between the liberal individualism (of the
earlier formulations of liberal pluralism) and a form of value collectivism (focused
on ontology cultural groups). It is therefore still premised on the moral importance
of the individual, but, it also suggests that individuals can only realize themselves
and exercise their autonomy fully in the context of groups. Thus, the collective goods
of cultures become crucial for individuals. It follows that a theory of differentiated
groups rights—with the ontological status of groups being bracketed—is required for
a genuine liberal individualism. Thus, the positive sense of individuality and human
autonomy is retained, but this is viewed through the lens of diverse groups and
cultures. The diversity of groups, in this sense, is viewed in a very much more emphatic
light. The argument is neither advocating a neutral constitutional settlement, non-
neutral perfectionism, nor a fearful recognition of groups. It is rather a celebration of
cultural primary goods as valuableforindividual autonomy.^12
This fourth liberal response (liberal multicultural pluralism) moves the argument,
by degrees, into a slightly different ontological setting. In summary, the first liberal
pluralists’ setting emphasizes tolerance, neutrality, and non-discriminatory universal
individual rights; the second abandons neutrality in favour of a liberal perfection-
ism, which is still of universal significance; the third view emphasizes, less positively