Segmented Foundations and Pluralism 223undermines the substance of the difference argument. This point, although important
for difference theorists, remains undertheorized and inchoate.
One further point to underscore here is that the difference theory (as outlined
above) doesnotnecessarily equate with multiculturalism. It certainly prioritizes and
valorizes difference, but not necessarilywithinany regimes or communities. This
is the point made earlier in the discussion—that ‘difference’ does not necessarily
entail internal multicultural difference. In fact, it might well be antagonistic to this
form of segmentation, in the sense that it might well be antagonistic to even further
fragmentation within a locality or culture. In this sense, difference theory (qua post-
colonialism) might well, in the final analysis, have far more in common with some
formulations of cultural nationalism. An account of difference, within the postcolo-
nial mode, is still crucial to the argument, but, it usually refers to external difference
of cultures, for example, oriental versus occidental, subaltern versus hegemonic, or
Asian Confucianism set against Western liberalism.
The third major category of difference theory is gender based. This is a highly self-
conscious and polemical expression of difference, although its internal theoretical
articulation has been very complex (see Vincent 1995: ch. 7; Squires 1999). The first
of these polemical arguments arose from feminist interest in difference during the
1960s and 1970s. However, this was quite definitely not the same notion of difference
as that articulated in the 1990s. It should also be noted that many liberal and socialist
feminist arguments have always been deeply impatient with difference-based claims,
partly because they (particularly liberal feminists) have seen equality and justice as
crucial universal values to foster and promote. The views of liberal feminists, such
as Susan Moller Okin discussed in Chapter Four, are clearly deeply antagonistic to
the claim that justice and equality are intrinsically gendered. Difference, for Okin or
Nussbaum, isnota valid ground for feminist argument (see Okin 1989; Nussbaum
and Glover (eds.) 1995). To defend difference, for Nussbaum for example, is tanta-
mount to defending oppressive practicesagainstwomen in different cultures (see
also Cohen, Howard, and Nussbaum (eds.) 1999). There may be biological, social,
or sexual differences between men and women, but these are morally and politic-
ally irrelevant. The really important issue is about attacking the gendered distortion
of equal treatment, social justice, and fairness. Thus, for liberal feminists, apart
from irrelevant biological differences, the only differences worth tackling are negative
‘social’ and ‘artificial’ ones. It is in this context that Okin has argued for the extension
of Rawlsian arguments, about justice and impartiality, into the family (Okin 1989).
The artificial gender-based readings of equality and justice are intrinsically irrational.
They are imposed by patriarchy and need to be forcefully addressed and ultimately
eradicated from the language of rationality, equality, and justice. Similarly, for Marx-
ist and socialist feminists, difference is something which is related to certain types of
highly contingent economic arrangements (capitalism and liberal free markets) and
should be systematically overcome with economic and political reform.
Yet outside the liberal and socialist feminists’ concerns, a large number of feminists
have become very exercised by the concept of difference. The earlier grounds for dif-
ference are though quite diverse and the history of its development since the 1960s has