The Nature of Political Theory

224 The Nature of Political Theory

been conceptually tangled. The roots of early 1970s feminist arguments on difference
were primarily social, biological, and psychological. The original critical interests in
difference go back to theorists, such as Kate Millet, who saw the masculine/feminine
distinction as part of a deep structure of patriarchal psychological exploitation. The
differences were viewed, initially, as social or psychological artefacts, constructed
within patriarchy, to keep women oppressively within certain roles. This idea was also
developed by certain radical feminist writers. The emphasis was then thrown onto the
ideal of androgyny. The central argument for androgyny effectively aimed to destroy
any political use for difference.
The androgyny thesis was then, in turn, subject to vigorous criticism. It was seen
to obscure the whole process of the struggle against patriarchy.^23 Difference therefore
reappeared positively, and with particular vehemence, in what is often referred to as
the second phase or wave of radical feminism. Initially, in certain radical feminist
writers, difference encompassed notions of female supremicism, the value of sister-
hood, political lesbianism, and separatism from men. Political lesbianism denoted
‘one who has withdrawn herself from the conventional definitions of femininity’
(Eisenstein 1984: 51). It was contended that women naturally had a very different
attitude to their bodies, nature, and human relationships. Motherhood was also seen
in positive light by certain writers, although not all shared the perspective of the
radicals (see Dinnerstein 1976; Ruddick 1980; Elshtain 1981). The capacity to phys-
ically bear children gave women highly positive life-affirming attitudes, whereas the
male was more easily caught up in negative life-denying aggression, competitiveness,
ambition, and social destructiveness. Andrea Dworkin, from a quite definitely radical
perspective, consequently characterized the male attitude to life as summed up in rape
and pornography (see Dworkin 1974, 1987). This particular theme was also taken
up again by some eco-feminists who linked environmental crises with destructive
patriarchal values.
In summary, this initial phase of difference theory often focused on what is loosely
termed ‘woman centred analysis’, emphasizing the biological and psychological dif-
ference between men and women. Thus, a frequent accusation made by radicals (and
‘maternal thinking’ feminists) against socialist and liberal feminist theories is that
they are ‘difference blind’. The primary aspect of this critical process is an emphasis
on the point that difference is a crucial mode of feminist emancipation. This form of
argument is also linked to some feminist writers’ assertions that there may be such a
thing as totally separate forms of feminine logic, epistemology, ontology, philosophy,
or even basic natural science. Thus, for example, it is possible to consider the whole
process of institutional, rational, and scientific discourse as inherently masculinist.
Feminist difference-based argument also took on a highly emblematic existence in
the psychologically- and morally-orientated work of Carol Gilligan, particularly in
her bookIn a Different Voice(1982), which basically argued that men and women
respond psychologically in very different ways in the field of ethics. Men function in
terms of a colder and more impersonal ethic of justice-based rules and women func-
tion through an ethic of care and nurturance. The ethic of care, set against the ethic
of justice, marked out a great deal of feminist discussion in the closing two decades