The Nature of Political Theory

226 The Nature of Political Theory

notion requiring genealogical investigation.^28 This view of reason defines humans in
certain ways, namely, according to their possession of this conception of practical
reason. For the proponents of this postmodern argument, this process gives rise to
the concept of the ‘inhuman’—namely those aspects that do not conform to this spe-
cific vision of reason. In effect, the practical reason argument rules out other ways of
being human. For postmodern writers, this in turn leads to other cultures, minorities,
women, or the colonized being viewed as immature, uneducated, or childish, simply
because they do not conform to acceptable definitions of humanity. Thus, the estab-
lishment of what it is to be human—in postmodern terminology—always carries its
‘other’ or the ‘inhuman’ with it.
This postmodern perspective on difference impacts upon a wide range of recent
writers. Thus, Bonnie Honig, for example, sees difference present in all claims to
identity. This implies, for her, ‘agentic fragmentation’ (Honig in Benhabib (ed.) 1996:
258 and 260). Difference not only exists externally within and between societies,
it is also embedded within all individual and group identities. Difference, in this
context, is far more than just liberal pluralism, which she considers a purely external
domesticated form of diversity. Difference is not therefore just anadjectiveof identity,
it is thesubstanceof every claim to identity. Honig views difference, therefore, as a form
of ‘agonism’. On a broader political level, she sees certain positive dimensions to this
recognition of agonism. Thus, agonism is seen to enable ‘more coalitional variants of
social-democratic organization’ (Honig in Benhabib (ed.) 1996, 260, 270–1). Honig’s
account also parallels the work of William Connolly, who also fulsomely embraces
the agonism thesis.^29 Both, in consequence, advocate, what they call, an ‘agonistic
democracy’. Consequently, the problems we experience in plural or diverse societies
are not the result of difference,per se, but rather of the attempt to find or impose an
identity. One small step beyond this is radical difference, which is one other possible
further reading of postmodern argument. Such radical difference focuses on total
fragmentation of society, conceiving each culture to be uniquely particular. It implies
complete ‘incommensurability’ of perspectives. Critics of this position (which would
include figures such as Honig and Connolly) maintain that it is flawed since it tries,
in effect, to ‘essentialize’ extreme differences of identity. There are, as such, fewer
example than one think of this position. One possible exemplar of this position
(although he does not really fit with the critics’ view of radical difference) is Jean
Francois Lyotard. For Lyotard, genres of discourse are not only plural, but also utterly
heterogeneous and irreducible to any common vocabulary. This is what he calls the
differend—namely, an irresolvable conflict.^30

Conclusion

Briefly summarizing the discussion: many political theorists, in the closing two dec-
ades of the twentieth century, moved away from the thin universalist account of
liberal justice and formal equality-based arguments. These latter arguments came