Standing Problems 239says ‘yes’ to a dedivinized reality. This is the agent who grasps with joy their own
will to power and regards nihilism as a positive and open opportunity. It is also an
acceptance of the primary role of the aesthetic creative dimension of human existence
over the ethical or religious. In essence it is a form of joyful nihilism.
The upshot of Nietzsche’s theory here is to undermine the entire structure of
Western metaphysics, morality, religion, and politics through the systematic and
extreme use of conventionalist argument. For in political theory there isnothingto
found any judgement on, except a recognition of the will to power. Political theory,
as much as anything else, is subject to the extremes of perspectivism and nihilism.
Some might find this world of ‘free spirits’ a terrifying or depressing vision. For
Nietzsche it was liberating. Such Nietzschean freedom has neither telos nor purpose.
The difficulty for Nietzsche (as for later postmodern writers) is what exactly is one
liberated fororto do. For many contemporary political theorists, to be without any
telos or substantive aim is to risk apathy, irresponsibility, or just insanity. In one sense,
it would not be an exaggeration to say that coming to terms with Nietzscheiscoming
to terms with both modernism and postmodernism.
Heidegger and Humanism
Before discussing the wider impact of Nietzsche’s philosophy on postmodern the-
ories, it is worth mentioning briefly the role of Heidegger. Nietzsche was viewed by
Heidegger in a specific way. He saw Nietzsche’s extreme perspectivism and conven-
tionalism, particularly his focus on the constitutive role of the will to power, as not so
much destroying Western metaphysics as ironically contributing another (and final)
strand to it. Although thinking through nihilism, Nietzsche, for Heidegger, was still
the victim of classical metaphysics. Nietzsche may have replaced the secure founda-
tionalism of Western metaphysics with the Heraclitean world of flux, becoming, and
indeterminacy. However, for Heidegger, metaphysics had not disappeared here, it had
rather arisen again from the flames of perspectivism as an extreme subjectivist and
nihilist metaphysics. In this sense, Nietzsche’s extreme subjectivism was seen to be
in the same mould as Descartes—but in this case a Cartesianism without God. As
Heidegger commented, ‘No matter how sharply Nietzsche pits himself time and again
against Descartes, whose philosophy grounds modern metaphysics, he turns against
Descartes only because the latterstilldoesnotposit man assubiectumin a way that is
complete and decisive enough’ (Heidegger 1982: 30).
The critique of metaphysics is crucial to understanding Heidegger’s oblique con-
tribution to postmodern argument. My main sounding board in analysing metaphy-
sics is Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’ (which Arendt referred to as Heidegger’s
Prachtstück—splendid effort). A series of distinctions runs through Heidegger’s essay.
The most crucial is that of thinking in and outside structured channels or discip-
lines. A second distinction is between humanism and the inhuman—a distinction
that Heidegger himself admits can be markedly misinterpreted. Finally, there is a
distinction between Being (Dasein) and what might be called ‘representations of