The Nature of Political Theory

242 The Nature of Political Theory

There are many questions to ask here—not least what on earth is Being?^11 The sep-
aration between Being or ‘ek-sistence’ from actual human life remains unexplained.
Surely, Being looks like another metaphysical abstraction? This chapter is not an ana-
lysis of Heideggerper seso I put aside these and other questions. Basically, Heidegger’s
response to metaphysics is negative. It is not wholly negative insofar as metaphysics
deals with Being as outward appearance. All metaphysics thus belong to the ‘history
of the truth of Being’, but metaphysicsper senonetheless distorts and misleads us and
obscures authentic Being.
In conclusion there are two alternatives here with regard to metaphysics, which
lead in radically different directions. The first is to be found in Nietzsche—that
the upshot of his perspectivism is simply a homeless nomadic self and an infinite
‘oblivion of being’. Heidegger regards this perspective as still nonetheless rooted in
the metaphysical impulse. It is still a reading firmly grounded on the metaphysics of
modernity, premised in Nietzsche’s case on the isolated ego or subject. This is one
important reading of the postmodern condition (which it should be noted Heideg-
ger is critical of), and it is a path adopted by many postmodern writers (although
they would vigorously deny the role of metaphysics). For Heidegger, the purported
attack on metaphysics has simply produced more metaphysics—a metaphysics that
has cast humans that much more adrift. The second alternative is to acknowledge
(once again) something deeper than conventional philosophy and thinking, which
roots humanity in the world. For Heidegger this does not call for a metaphysics but
rather alisteningandwaitingupon Being, as the real dwelling place of humanity.
Heidegger is insistent that this is not a new form of transcendental metaphysics. This
latter path both touches upon postmodern themes and also moves outside them.
The stress on Being particularly is deeply unpostmodern. In this sense, Heidegger’s
contribution to postmodernism lies ambiguously intwopoints. The first concerns
his critical pursuit of Nietzsche, in essence accusing him of still propounding a ‘meta-
physics of subjectivism’. In this sense, Heidegger pushes once again at foundational
arguments at an even deeper level than Nietzsche. Heidegger in this sense can be seen
as more radical and postmodern than Nietzsche in attacking foundational claims even
more systematically. Second, the root of Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche is his own
view of the history of Western metaphysics as one long series of errors and myths.
This has been pursued several steps again by writers such as Derrida. Both these
arguments therefore correspond closely to what has happened subsequently in post-
modern theory—particularly in writers like Derrida, Foucault, Rorty, and Lyotard.
Where Heidegger does diverge from postmodern theory and paradoxically returns to
an older non-postmodern argument, is in his own fundamental idea of Being.

Derrida and Foucault

Moving from Heidegger and Nietzsche into more recent postmodern argument, there
is one very important implication of Heidegger’s argument that needs to be under-
scored. Metaphysics, for Heidegger, distorts and merely represents Being. Metaphysics