The Nature of Political Theory

244 The Nature of Political Theory

of man’. Thus, in this analysis Derrida claims that Heidegger takes us back to human-
ism and the ‘essence of man’ in metaphysics (Derrida 1993: 145). Restoration of this
essence means the restoration of man’s and Being’s dignity. Traditional humanism is
opposed by Heidegger, according to Derrida, because it does ‘not set thehumanitas
of man high enough’ (Derrida 1993: 147). Man is the proper place of Being—there is
a ‘co-propriety’ of humanity and Being.
What we find here is that Derrida accuses Heidegger of exactly the same collapse
into metaphysics as Heidegger had accused Nietzsche (see Derrida 1976: 19). Thus,
Derrida pushes once again against the whole idea of foundations. Metaphysics could
only be routed if the idiom of philosophy was ‘deconstructed’. Language was viewed by
the philosophical tradition as a transparent medium of thought, where the signified
(objects in the world or mind) could be caught in the web of our language and words
(signs). This point touches upon the better-known dimensions of Derrida. However
it approaches the same thought on metaphysics (outlined earlier) from a different
direction.
The other side of his critique, which I will only briefly summarize, is Derrida’s cri-
tique of structuralism.^13 Derrida basically criticizes structuralism immanently—that
is, from within (which is characteristic of deconstruction in general). For Derrida,
neither structuralists nor Heidegger pushed their arguments hard enough. Both
are seen to be on the cusp of an antihumanism. Structuralism opposed the dia-
chronic analysis of language—that is, focusing on the history of words. Conversely,
it argued for a synchronic form of explanation, which implied that meaning depends
on relations between an existing system of signs. A linguistic sign was viewed as a
deep structural relation between a word (signifier) and concept (signified). Meaning
was thus dependent on therelationsbetween signs—many of which functioned in
terms of basic binary contrasts. One important upshot of structuralism was that it
undermined the idea of any linguistic presentation as being mere presence. It also
destabilized humanity by placing it within a complex web of linguistic relations.
However, for structuralists there was also a stable centre that could be studied (by
structural linguistics or structural anthropology). Derrida fundamentally disagreed
here. Pushing hard at Saussure’s and Levi-Strauss’ arguments, Derrida argues that
the sign in language and the signified (the object) actuallynevercome together.All
we have are signs. Words are necessary but always inadequate. They never capture a
reality. Meaning remains the elusive property of signs and corresponds with nothing
outside them—except other texts or signs. Derrida describes this latter idea as ‘inter-
textuality’. Copying Heidegger here—who found the word ‘Being’ simply inadequate
and therefore crossed it out within his texts—Derrida also widens the net to a more
consistently applied ‘writing under erasure’. Each sign is inexhaustible and there is
no way to resolve differences of meaning. This is the core of Derrida’s neologism
différance. It implies that—in the final analysis—meaning has always to be deferred.
It also underscores the permanent mutation and becoming of language. We can never
master language and we can never discover any true meaning. Representation can
never indicate a ‘presence’, since it must always involve the recognition of perman-
entdifféranceimplicit in the signs we use, which implies in turn endless deferral or