The Nature of Political Theory

254 The Nature of Political Theory

apparent horizon, foundation, or pre-understanding. It is, though, a deeply problem-
atic and disturbing vision that is in permanent danger of collapsing into a nihilistic
melancholy. One case in point is the work of Jean-François Lyotard, particularly his
theory of the ‘differend’. Lyotard sees his own work on the differend in the context of a
more widespread decline of universalism, the attack on humanism and metaphysics,
the turn to language in philosophy, and more general weariness with theory.
Lyotard’s bookThe Differendis less well known although more philosophically
sophisticated than the earlierThe Postmodern Condition. However, the latter contains
the most widely used definition of postmodernism as ‘incredulity toward metanar-
ratives’ (Lyotard 1991a: xxiv; see also Lyotard 1997).^27 The Postmodern Condition,
largely, utilizes Wittgenstein’s theory of language games to elucidate the postmodern
mentality (see Lyotard 1991a:9ff.). There is no world as such, only a multiplicity
of language games. InThe Differendthe term ‘phrase’ replaces ‘language game’. Yet,
the two thinkers Lyotard considers as most overtly influential on his perspective are
Kant (particularly of the 3rdCritique) and Wittgenstein (qua thePhilosophical Invest-
igations). Yet, again, he sees both as transitional thinkers or as he puts it, ‘epilogues
to modernity and prologues to an honourable postmodernity’. In effect, they ‘draw
up the affidavit ascertaining the decline of universalist doctrines’ (Lyotard 1999: xiii).
Unsurprisingly, Descartes is seen (with Husserl) as the ultimate philosophical expres-
sion of modernity. In the case of Kant and Wittgenstein, however, something unique
happens. In Kant, the ‘free examination of phrases leads to the (critical) dissociation of
their regimens (the separation of the faculties and their conflict...)’. In Wittgenstein,
there is a ‘disentanglement of language games’. Together both thinkers ‘lay the ground
for the thought of dispersion which,...shapes our context’. The problem with both
thinkers, which Lyotard wishes to slough off, is what he calls the ‘cumbersome debt to
anthropomorphism (the notion of “use” in both, an anthropomorphism that is trans-
cendental in Kant, empirical in Wittgenstein)’ (Lyotard 1999: xiii). In other words,
both thinkers are still too taken up with the vestiges of foundational metaphysics and
humanism.
Lyotard’s own theory of the differend can be stated quite briefly. He lays it out with
admirable clarity in the opening section ofThe Differend. Essentially, a differend is
‘a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved
for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments. One side’s legitimacy
does not imply the other’s lack of legitimacy...applying a single rule of judgment
to both in order to settle their differend as though it were a litigation would wrong
(at least) one of them’. The key issue is that a ‘universal rule of judgment between
heterogeneous genres is lacking’ (Lyotard 1999: xi). The core of the book is contained
in these few sentences, although its ramifications are considerable.
The key term ‘phrase’, which replaces the anthropomorphism of ‘language games’,
is employed somewhat abstractly, although it can still be viewed as a socio-linguistic
conventional practice (as in a language game). Phrases are constituted by sets of
rules that Lyotard calls ‘regimens’. There are a number of ‘phrase regimens’, for
example, knowing, describing, recounting, and so forth. Phrase regimens are linked
together by various (what Lyotard calls) ‘genres of discourse’. Genres ‘supply rules