284 The Nature of Political Theory‘forms’ of reason and therefore differing modes of communication. Philosophy, in
this context, takes on a more self-effacing role, interpreting, and arbitrating between
types of substantive forms of reason or knowledge spheres, making sure that one par-
ticular sphere of knowledge does not dominate. It is important to note here that for
Habermas it is not only the danger of positivistic instrumental reasoning dominat-
ing the lifeworld.^12 There is also a danger of the historical–hermeneutic perspect-
ive becoming dominant for other sectors—as a form of ‘positivism’ of the cultural
sciences.
In his reconstructive enterprise, Habermas sees a fertile development in philo-
sophical doctrines such as pragmatism and hermeneutics. The importance he sees
in both doctrines is their move away from the philosophy of the solitary subject
and philosophy of consciousness. They rather stress ‘an idea of cognition that is
mediated by language and linked to action’ (Habermas in Baynes et al. 1993: 304).
They both underscore the dimension of communication. In other words, as opposed
to stressing the epistemologically based philosophy of the subject, they emphas-
ize the intersubjectivity of acting and speaking.^13 Both doctrines epitomize issues
of human action and language over the subject-centred self-reflective conscious-
ness. Thus issues, such as those attacked by Richard Rorty, like the ‘mirror of
nature’ in representational epistemology, are seen as irrelevant to the communica-
tive or intersubjective stance. What is of more importance, for Habermas, is that
the intersubjective paradigm raises the question of the context of intersubjectivity,
namely the preunderstandings. The implicit danger of moving into the realm of
ordinary intersubjective communication is that for some this can translate as an
‘anti-philosophical stance’, or, as Habermas puts it, a ‘good riddance to philosophy’
perspective. This entails that once one moves away from the tight rationalist paradigm
of the epistemology of the subject, by definition, one appears to move away from
philosophy. In this sense, for some, the radical attack on the subject means the end of
philosophy.
Habermas sees three possible modern variants of the ‘end of philosophy’ idea: the
therapeutic, heroic, and salvaging farewell. The ‘therapeutic’ refers to Wittgenstein’s
language games, which have no need of any philosophy to function. Philosophy could
thus be seen as utterly parasitic. For Habermas, in this context, anthropology seems
most likely to replace philosophy. He describes Rorty as the potential Thucydides of
this perspective! The ‘heroic’ can be found in the destructive moves of Heidegger
and Bataille. The bogus role of philosophy is replaced by something deeper, such as
Heidegger’s mystificatory ‘waiting on Being’. Habermas sees the ‘salvaging farewell’
perspective present in hermeneutics. It focuses on the assimilation of texts ‘that were
once thought to embody knowledge, treating them instead as sources of illumination
and edification’ (Habermas in Baynes et al. 1993: 307). All these anti-philosophical
views go wrong for Habermas in that ‘philosophical conversation cannot but gravitate
towards argumentation and justificatory dispute. There is no alternative’ (Habermas
in Baynes et al. 1993: 309). However, the need is for theories of rationality which are
more sensitive to difference and fallibilism, thus avoiding strong foundationalist or
absolutist claims.