Circular Foundations 295This is another way of speaking of the distinction between understanding and explana-
tion. Activity can be elucidated through expressions revealing mental intentions. For
Dilthey, the comprehension of meaning, that is of the ‘mental’ expression, is the
‘understanding’. The understanding is based primarily on recovering the psychology
and intentionality of the author. This theme of recovering intentions, within a his-
torical and social context, has remained an important element in some hermeneutic
writings to the present, for example, in the work of Emilio Betti, E. D. Hirsch and, to
some extent, Quentin Skinner.
For Dilthey, to bring together a number of acts of ‘understanding’, in order to grasp
a more complex expression, involves ‘interpretation’. The method, which deals with
interpretation is hermeneutics. Because, for Dilthey, the human sciences in general—
by which he meant disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, politics, jurisprudence,
literary studies, and literary criticism—are constituted or constructed by these com-
plexes of expressions, it follows that hermeneutics is central to the study of human
sciences. Hermeneutics is involved therefore with the science of interpretation of texts,
events, and discourse.^1 However, it is important to grasp that this is an understanding
of the ‘knowing subject’ of Cartesianism, a theme which is still present very much
in Dilthey’s position. Dilthey tended also to associate the meaning of a text with the
subjective intention of the author. However, the knowing subject is still tied to her
physical body, a body which exists within a particular social and historical situation.^2
The fourth stage in the development of hermeneutics takes us firmly into the
twentieth century and the work of Gadamer. Before discussing Gadamer’s her-
meneutics in detail, there are certain general points concerning twentieth century
hermeneutics, which should be underscored. First, hermeneutics has now come to
be seen as far more than a method for historical or social study (qua Dilthey). In
fact, some twentieth century hermeneutics is totally opposed to viewing it this way.
Second, a much richer hermeneutical theory has been developed, which proposes
a sophisticated ontology and a social and political theory, premised on dialogue
and communication. Parallel to Habermas’s work, twentieth century hermeneutics
is post-conventional in texture and tries to mediate between conventionalism and
universalism. Third, this conception of hermeneutics is very much a product of intel-
lectual debates concerning both conventionalism and postmodernism. It is therefore
set against the backdrop of perspectivism (as examined in Part Four), although it reads
this perspectivism in a very different and unique manner. Fourth, hermeneutics tends
to view our perspectives as pragmatic historical interventions. Our judgements and
perceptions are not therefore representations or reflections of the world, but rather
constitutive interpretations.
Finally, it is clear from this brief discussion that hermeneutics isnotone thing. An
initial distinction can be drawn between, first, hermeneutics as a method and, second,
hermeneutics as an ontology. The ‘method’ conception is one that is still present in
the twentieth century in writers such as Betti, Hirsch, or Skinner. It shows little
interest in anything but the methodological concerns.^3 In Gadamerian hermeneutics,
this method-based perspective is rejected in favour of an ontological theory. How-
ever, this second type of ontological hermeneutics can be further subdivided again