Circular Foundations 307medium of language and dialogue, through which we discuss our differences. Like
Habermas, Gadamer’s theory uses dialogue as a way to negotiate his way between both
universalism and conventionalism. The norms and processes, implicit in dialogue,
absorb the subjectivities of the participants. The dialogue itself is notpremisedon
the thick social conventions, but, conversely, on whether there is a genuine fusion of
horizons. This is the central ‘trick’—referred to earlier in the Habermas discussion—
of both the Habermasian and Gadamerian schemes. It is not determined by social
conventions (contra strong contextualism), but, at the same time, it is still claimed
to be the essential element of ordinary conventions (contra universalism). It is clear,
on one level, that Gadamer does not exactly go out of his way to acknowledge any
universalist themes in his work. In fact, his overt reputation is more historically
relativist.
However, the most productive domain for considering these universalist themes is
through a consideration of his use of a number of arguments: first, the hermeneutic
circle, second, the coming to an understanding in terms of a fusion of horizons,
third, the concept of intersubjective play, fourth, the negative reading of human
experience and finally, the infinite character of interpretation. The final upshot of
this understanding of Gadamer is that there is an implicit, pragmatically orientated,
political, and ethical theory present in his work. He is neither claiming to establish
any overt normative foundations, nor is he advocating a fragmented conventionalist
thesis. It would thus be a travesty to think of his work as relativist, Nietzschean or
postmodern.
First, the hermeneutic circle has a number of possible senses. The most significant
are the methodological, epistemological, and ontological. The first two will not detain
us. The methodological reading can be found specifically in some of the earlier
hermeneutic writings. It essentially focuses on the circular interrelation between a
reader and the text. Another early formulation is the relation between the part and
whole. For example, a particular text may need to be grasped through the whole
of a language, but the whole only makes sense in relation to the particular texts.
In the epistemological reading, the methodological point is sharpened, insofar as
the circle declaims that one always assumes what one is trying to prove, which is
a classic logical conundrum. In essence, in the methodological and epistemological
readings of the circle it sounds like a vicious logical fallacy, which one should try
to avoid.
However, in Gadamer’s ontological reading of the hermeneutic circle, something
new is proposed. The circle is tieduniversallyto the very nature of human language,
thought, and practice. In this sense, the circle is rooted in our very being-in-the-world
and consequently it is seen as ontological. For Gadamer, it is neither a vicious logical
circle, nor something to be avoided. It is rather to be embraced. The essence of the
ontological character of the circle is that every interpretation inevitably draws on our
anticipations, prejudices, and unspoken traditions. There is a continuous reflexivity,
or circling back, which is characteristic of the whole human species. Reflexivity is
an ontological universal. There are no substantive normative vantage points, and
no presuppositionless knowing. This is the sense in which Gadamer denies that