The Nature of Political Theory

Conclusion 321

who are of key significance, are Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. It is the
anti-foundationalist writings of both these thinkers which are crucial for grasping
this latter phase. This anti-foundational perspective promotes the view that political
theorists have a vital, but overwhelmingly negative, role to play. However, there are
a number of important ambiguities in the way that the postmodern argument has
been deployed. There are also considerable doubts as to whether they actually escape
foundational claims. In summary, a great deal of the attention of anti-foundational
theorists has been directed to genealogically exposing, unmasking, or deconstructing
the unrationalized, arbitrary, and contingent elements which have figured in much
humanistic and social discourse.
The final phase is premised upon a rejection of both the radical conventionalist and
positive universalist arguments. It is, in fact, self-consciously post-foundationalist. It
envisages itself as part of new constellation of ideas which have outgrown, dialectically,
both conventionalist and universalist foundationalism. Its focus is largely on language
and dialogue. In this context, political theories can be derived from fundamental
considerations presupposed within the nature of all language, rational discourse, and
communication. This is a general theme which was developed, initially in the mid to
late twentieth century, and has subsisted contemporaneously with the other phases
outlined. It is focused, in this study, on developments in both critical theory and
hermeneutics and has been explored in the writings of both Jürgen Habermas and
Hans-Georg Gadamer. In my own reading, though, despite rejecting comprehensive
views of metaphysical foundations, both theorists still find an immanent and logically
prior foundation for political theory within ‘dialogue’. In this sense, it is a qualified,
occasionally circumspect, yet still bold attempt, to reconstitute political theory on the
basis of the implications of dialogue.
The above phases are not considered progressively. Although there are some vestiges
of a chronology here, it is not meant to be teleologically significant. All of these
phases outlined coexist, to a degree, at the present moment. Some of the phases have
been given greater, or much less, emphasis at certain points during the twentieth
century. In summary, this book has examined a number of variations on the theme
of foundationalism. The above discussion is only a spare outline summary, not a
definitive categorization.

THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE AGAIN

There is one further critical supposition underpinning this book which needs to be
briefly articulated. This is the idea of the hermeneutic circle, developed in thinkers
such as Gadamer. In this sense, it is not fortuitous that the present study ends with an
account of Gadamer on dialogue. The hermeneutic circle, qua Gadamer, as indicated
in Chapter Ten, is understood as intrinsic to the human condition, and is consequently
considered ontologically, rather than epistemologically. The circle is a universal facet
of human existence. It is not a logically-vicious circle. It is not something to be just
avoided. The core of the ontological nature of the circle is that all interpretation,