322 The Nature of Political Theoryinescapably, brings into play our prejudices and traditions. There is an incessant
reflexivity, or ‘circling back’ to our prejudices. The prejudices and fore-structures are
considered, in this book, to be thefoundationson which we premise our judgements.
Reflexivity is therefore configured as an ontological aspect of all human thought, that
is, the folding back of reasoning upon its own foundations is part of our nature, and
therefore inevitably part of the nature of political theory. There isnopresupposi-
tionless political knowing. We cannot disregard our prejudices or tradition, since to
converse, to examine, to analyse, or to theorize is to summon them (wittingly or
unwittingly). Prejudices and traditions are the conditions of all dialogue. The key
point is to acknowledge this state of affairs and operate self-critically and candidly
with and through our prejudices. We therefore have to make our own fore-structure
as transparent as possible both to ourselves and others. This process can be achieved
in the play of dialogue. Despite its central place in human thought, this hermeneutic
task is infrequently practised, even within universities. Students are not actually given
the space, time, or encouragement to think in this critical humanizing manner. The
positivistic and empiricist mentality is intrinsically always impatient with the utility
of such hermeneutic study. There is a peculiar myopia concerning this mentality in
much recent academic work. This can be as true of philosophy as any other discipline.^1
Open critical dialogue situates us in an already interpreted world of traditions. For
Gadamer, as suggested, this is a process of dialectic andBildung—closely linked to
the psychological and moral growth and maturity of the individual. Being attuned
to the ontological nature of the circle, makes us heedful of our own fallibility and
finiteness, particularly in terms of our knowing within politics and ethics. It creates
an inclination to not exaggerate or to assert the superiority of our own moral or
political prejudices. In my reading of Gadamer it also has close conceptual links
with the idea of coming to an understanding, in terms of a fusion of horizons,
the idea of dialogue as intersubjective play, and the essentially negative reading of
human experience (genuine experience being understood as a continuous challenge
to our existing suppositions). As argued in Chapter Ten, the final upshot of these
ideas is an implicit, pragmatically orientated, political and ethical theory, which is
neither claiming to establish any overt normative foundations, nor is it advocating a
fragmented conventionalist thesis.
One way of reformulating the above point is that political theory needs to shift
back towards and reflect upon the prejudices and traditions which constitute human
lives. This would entail a shift towards the ‘rhetoric of ordinariness’, that is to say,
political theory needs to acknowledge the primacy of ordinary human practice and
the prejudices and traditions which constitute it. Further, we need, once again, to
value reasonable uncertainties, ambiguity, hesitancy, and vacillation in human affairs,
over and against the demands for absolute rational certainty, fixity of purpose, and
decisive proof. We should not be so concerned to place a template of universalistic
rationality over the world, which it has to measure up to. The world will always
disappoint the universalist and rationalist. Conversely it is the fore-structure of our
prejudices which constitute our practice. There is nothing outside them. Practical
knowledge is embedded knowledge; it provides answers to certain questions. But, it