24 The Nature of Political Theoryinterpretation), it had been resisted or downgraded by other significant sectors of
twentieth century political theory. These ‘other’ sectors will be discussed in detail in
Part Two. Yet these other sectors of political theory became, in turn, less influen-
tial in the last two decades of the twentieth century. In fact, in some scenarios—for
example, in the debate over the death of political theory—such accounts have come
to be regarded, with hindsight, as just peculiar. Thus, in this more inclusive read-
ing, normative theory (or grand theory) was able, apparently, to return in all its full
glory by the end of the twentieth century. Much of the significant normative work in
political theory, in the last three decades of the twentieth century, has self-consciously
placed itself in this traditional location.
It would also be true to say that many of the notable figures of early- to mid-
twentieth century political theory, such as Leo Strauss, Bertrand de Jouvenal, Han-
nah Arendt, Eric Voegelin, Michael Oakeshott, Yves Simon, Simone Weil, Friedrich
Hayek, and many others, clearly perceived themselves to be part of this ongoing
grand normative tradition. In this case, it was not a broken tradition (as perceived
by many Anglophone analytic theorists), but rather a continuing and vigorous one.
In addition, the early- to mid-twentieth century period was also the era of the aca-
demic institutionalization of the standard history of political thought textbooks. This,
again, buttressed the self-perception of an unbroken normative tradition. How indeed
could one possibly doubt the existence of this long tradition: it was there, vouch-
safed by a large number of scholarly texts! In the late twentieth century theory, this
self-perception of a continuous normative tradition has continued unabated.
Apart from the above mainstream theorists, ironically, most of the widely used
political theory textbooks, in the 1940s to 1970s (and even until comparatively
recently), took a slightly more reserved or even conservative line on normative the-
ory. The reasons for this reluctance rests on the point made above, for example, that
Anglophone conceptualist analytic theory was the more dominant perspective, for a
time, and it tended to downgrade direct normativism. Thus, conceptual understand-
ing, rigorous analysis, and impartial evaluation took clear priority over normative
or prescriptive recommendation. The closest one comes to normativism is in the
elusive concept of ‘conceptual evaluation’, which is usually a shorthand for a more
duplicitous normativism. Thus, conventionally, within the analytic conceptualist
position, a political concept, after rigorous analysis—the adjective ‘rigour’ bestowing
a furtive symbolic imprimatur—‘evaluation’ takes place and then, magically, ones
interpretation of the concept becomes the favoured reading.
There are a number of examples of these types of textbooks, which range from
a minimal restrained analytic conservatism to a more confident evaluative position.
The general theme is a rigorous conceptual analysis conjoined with an evaluation—
although sometimes just one aspect is emphasized. Andrew Hacker, for example,
saw the key goal of political theory as simply to enhance conceptual understanding
and clarity. John Plamenatz, in a more famous definition in 1960, defined political
theory as ‘systematic thinking about the purposes of government’ (Plamenatz 1960:
37; Hacker 1961: 20). Alan Gewirth defined political theory as ‘the moral evaluation
of power’ (Gewirth 1965: 1); David Raphael, in another well-known text of the 1970s