We Have a Firm Foundation 57(Nagel 1961: 4). The basic contention was that scientific theories could grasp an
objective reality through a neutral observation language. Reality was definitelynot
structured or constituted by natural science theory. Theories tell us, in a moderately
detached way,abouta reality.^44 Explanations in the natural sciences, utilizing a neutral
observation language, could thus be defined as systematically related propositions
about an external reality, propositions which may, in certain contexts, be described
as laws supported by empirical evidence. The general framework within which this
kind of theory functions is usually called positivism. Political science, from the 1950s
particularly, stressed this approach.
The concept positivism is, however, complex. It denotes two broad ideas. First, it
indicates those who accept the designation positivist, such as Auguste Comte or the
Viennese logical positivism movement—although the latter are occasionally cited as
neo-positivist. Comte’s legacy—especially via positivist sociology—formed a back-
groundsetof beliefs, whichresonatewithlaterpositivistsympathizersinthetwentieth
century. Comte’s idea that positive science (or philosophy) would triumph ultimately
over metaphysics and religion (both the latter being viewed as prior, more prim-
itive, stages of human development); his insistence on a clear boundary between
empirically-tested facts and imaginary theoretical constructions; his strong belief in
progress through science; and, his assertion of the linkage between moral and material
progress (i.e. the knowledge that science provides would allow all manner of techno-
logical control in both the natural and the social and political fields), all impacted on
early twentieth century positivist theory.
The second sense of positivism, which reasserts many of the Comteian ideals,
embodies a more general adherence to certain epistemological theses, for example: the
unity of the sciences; the belief that the only valid standard of knowledge we have lies
either in the empirical sciences or logic and mathematics; the assumption of the reality
of sense impressions; the conception of a scientific theorist as a dispassionate observer
who never asserts anything which has not been empirically proved; an intense dislike
and mistrust of metaphysical thought; adherence to a notion of philosophy as analysis,
and its being parasitic upon science; the acceptance of the clear distinction between
fact and value; more specifically, the belief that the natural and social sciences share a
certain common methodology; also the belief in a growing body of empirically-tested
positive knowledge.
There have beentwobroad manifestations of this latter positivist tendency this
century. The first relates to the neo-Kantian distinction between theoretical and
practical reason, a distinction that is supposed to make room for autonomy and
moral judgement. Increasingly neo-Kantianism, in the twentieth century, became
sceptical of the moral autonomy that Kant had postulated. Values became increasingly
suspect. Facts though were certain. This distinction became a crucial plank in the
neo-Kantianism behind Max Weber’s sociology work and his distinctions between
value free social science and moral discourse. Weber was no simple-minded positivist.
Moral and religious values were of importance to individuals, but he still adhered to
the idea that there was a clear heterogeneity between facts and values and that science
had no answers to the question how we ought to live. Under Nietzsche’s tutelage,