We Have a Firm Foundation 63of its more rigorous critics still applaud its empirical and scientific aspirations as its
most valuable asset (see Green and Schapiro 1994: 10).
Rational choice in many ways ideally fills the more optimistic self-perception of
empirical political theory. It embodies a purportedly rigorously empirically testable
and scientifically-based research programme and yet, at the same time, it can fulfil all
the requirements (for its proponents) of a normative political theory, once one has
accepted the above foundational assumptions.
The problem on the empirical front is that it is far from clear that it has had much
empirical success. The central contention of a recent synoptic study of rational choice
therefore notes, ‘curiously...the stature of rational choice scholarship does not rest
on a readily identifiable set of empirical successes’. The authors comment that most
critics do not in fact focus on the empirical or operationalized aspect of the doctrine.
They note that this aspect of rational choice work (which they examine exhaustively)
is generally ‘marred by unscientifically chosen samples, poorly conducted tests, and
tendentious interpretations of results. As a consequence, despite its enormous and
growing prestige in the discipline, rational choice theory has yet to deliver on its
promise to advance the empirical study of politics’ (Green and Schapiro 1994: 5
and 7). Part of the problem here, for the authors, is that this empirical weakness is
rooted in the desire to establish a universal empirical theory of politics, which has
resulted in rational choice being ‘method driven’ rather than ‘problem driven’ (Green
and Schapiro 1994: 202–3; see also Schapiro 2002).
The bulk of the criticism on the normative front focuses on a number of well-
trodden paths. Rational choice is clearly premised on an unquestioned empiricist
metaphysics. However, its basic foundational elements neither seem very plausible,
nor ultimately very reasonable to its critics. Basically—apart from the fact that they are
not really empirically verified—the above set of assumptions are regarded frequently
as simply false and misleading. The assumption of the isolated or atomized individual
is highly questionable and sociologically and historically contentious. It embodies an
excessively narrow and slightly weird perspective on human beings. Minimally, it
simply cannot account for the complexity and idiosyncrasies of human individuals,
when they act morally or politically. To reduce all individual action and choice to
instrumental personal preference rankings, utility maximization and self-interests
does little or no justice to human nature or human action. The same point holds for
more orthodox utilitarianism. It might give us some very partial insight into some
collective actions, but that it is about it. It also employs an excessively narrow and
deeply-arbitrary conception of human rationality.
Apart from certain more random and idiosyncratic offshoots in, for example,
Marxist rational choice, critics see not so much a universal foundational empirical
political theory, as a somewhat pessimistic ideological doctrine, driven by a parochial
North American conception of neo-classical liberal market economics and utilitarian
calculus (which even orthodox economists would feel uneasy with). Its importance
reflectsmoreonthepowerandinfluenceofNorthAmerica, ratherthananytheoretical
depth or long term intellectual significance. Intrinsic to this model are a number of
deeply-questionable foundational assumptions. It is essentially inclined ideologically