The Nature of Political Theory

70 The Nature of Political Theory

philosophy with ideology. He suggests the utter uselessness of ‘the distinction between
“ideology” and a form of thought...which escapes being “ideology” ’ (Rorty 1989:
59). In this context, there are no clear criteria to differentiate them. If political
philosophy still claims a special insight into the world, as distinct from other forms
of thought like ideology, then it is simply mistaken. For the nonfoundationalist the
representational perspective of some philosophers is better understood as pathol-
ogy rather than philosophy.
Moving now to thenegative segregationthesis: this dimension forms the stand-
ard response of much twentieth century Anglo-American political theory, although a
great deal depends here on exactly how one perceives political theory or philosophy—
particularly philosophy. A common and quite pervasive view of philosophy during
the twentieth century is to see it as a higher, more critical or purer calling. No matter
what the philosophy espoused, it is seen as distinct from ideology. The most charac-
teristic conception of ideology is that of a tainted or debased product, which lacks the
virtues of political philosophy. In this interpretation, political philosophy is generally
marked out by a reflective openness, critical distance, a focus on following the argu-
ment regardless, and an awareness of human experience, which transcends political
struggles. Ideology, on the other hand, would be viewed as the opposite. It closes
reflection, throws itself into partisan struggle, its ideas are designed instrumentally to
manipulate actors, close argument, and ultimately to achieve political power. It has
no concern with truth.
A large number of twentieth-century political theorists have held variations of this
thesis, for example, Germino, Arendt, Oakeshott, Voegelin, and Strauss. Strauss is
quite typical here. Philosophy is seen as an ancient quest for wisdom and universal
knowledge, that is, ‘the knowledge of God, the world and man’ (Strauss 1959: 11).
Political ideology, however, is indifferent to the distinction between knowledge and
opinion, is wholly tied to historical contingencies and is concerned with the uncrit-
ical espousal of myths. Ideology denotes both modernity and nihilism. The broader
theme, which underpins this idea, in Strauss, is the debate between the ancients and
moderns, discussed earlier. For Strauss, the modern era has seen a decline of political
philosophy into ideology (see also Oakeshott 1991). This negative appraisal is reflec-
ted, in different terminology, in the twentieth century analytic style of philosophy. In
logical positivism, for example, philosophy is viewed as a second-order activity. It did
not contribute any first-order knowledge, as in natural science.^57 Propositions, which
might loosely be grouped under the label ‘normative’ or ‘metaphysical’, do not tell us
about the world, rather they reveal the emotional or psychological state of individuals.
In this sense, ideology, with most other evaluative domains of thought, becomes sub-
jective emotional meaningless gush. Further, in early ordinary language philosophy,
the task of philosophy is perceived to be the close attention to the ordinary use of
words and concepts. However, ordinary language is still in agreement with logical
positivism that philosophy doesnotinclude justification or prescription. The same
point would hold for the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. Political philosophy
has a more substantive role to play, but it is still a second-order activity distinct from
direct normative claims as might be found in ideology.