Foundations Shaken but Not Stirred 87In summary, therefore, for logical positivism, analytic propositions werea priori
claims to be found in mathematical, logical, and lexical statements. Synthetic empir-
ical propositions were those characteristically found in the sciences, which could be
empirically verified. Philosophy was seen as a universal ‘second order’ activity. It did
not offer or contribute any first order knowledge to the world. First order knowledge
was the domain of the sciences. The world of the philosopher was thus taken as a given
one, which the philosopher examined and used as the material of argument. In many
ways this was a congenial vision of the role of philosophical theory for behavioural
political scientists.
The early Wittgenstein is often taken as an inspiration for the logical positivists.
Undoubtedly, hisTractatus Logico Philosophicus(1921) was read and admired by the
Vienna group.^3 The basic doctrines of theTractatuswere of considerable interest to the
group. Wittgenstein arguments, at this point, were close to Bertrand Russell’s doctrine
of logical atomism.^4 The core theory underpinning Wittgenstein’s work is often called
the ‘picture theory’, which asserts that our language pictures the world. Words stand
for the facts or configurations of objects that they represent. As Wittgenstein put it in
the opening sequence of theTractatus: ‘The world is everything that is the case’ and
‘The world is the totality of facts’ (Wittgenstein 1922: sections 1 and 1.1). Meaningful
sentences must correspond to the reality of facts, in Russell’s case, logical atoms.
Wittgenstein also postulated that there were ultimately irreducible simple facts or
states of affairs in the world to which sentences refer. These atoms are pictured by
elementary propositions. Elementary propositions or sentences consist of the names
of the elements arranged in ways that reflect the structure of facts. As Wittgenstein
notes, ‘We make to ourselves pictures of facts’ (Wittgenstein 1922: section 2.1). This
constitutes the truth or falsity of sentences.^5 Language is therefore words arranged in
sentences that mirror those facts. Complex propositions or sentences are held to be
‘truth functional’ compounds of elementary sentences or propositions.
For the early Wittgenstein, logic is essentially a set of rules for constructing pro-
positions out of fact-picturing propositions. All statements referring to the rules of
propositional logic are tautologies. Mathematics and logic are again tautologous. They
do not picture the world in any way. Tautologies are true by definition. This point
was admired particularly by the logical positivists, if not by Russell. There is also an
implicit adherence to the verificationist principle. For Wittgenstein, sentences that are
not verifiable are without sense. However, unlike the logical positivists, Wittgenstein
was not keen to dismiss them as utter nonsense or emotion. Even if we cannot discuss
such things as ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics, they still appear as more mystical
to Wittgenstein, rather than nonsensical. Unlike the logical positivists, Wittgenstein
clearly felt the pull of metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics, even if he denied their
epistemological role, whereas virtually none of the Vienna group felt this impulsion.
Even Wittgenstein’s friend and admirer, F. P. Ramsay, sensed reprovingly this impulse
in him, remarking famously that some things cannot be said, but neither can they be
whistled. In the final analysis, however, the status of theTractatusarguments came
under suspicion (as Wittgenstein was aware), since they also were neither tautologous
nor verifiable. In this context, Wittgenstein refers to his own philosophy as not so