162 Nietzschebecause there is nothing that remains identical, even for the moment of
comparison. For Spir, therefore, the disclosed essence of the world—
concealed by the space of logic and language—is the wodd of absolute
becoming.
Nietzsche, who wanted to accept the "disclosed essence of the
world" for the time being only as a cooled-off logical postulate after his
Dionysian excesses, was, of course, delighted with a logician who por-
trayed the world of becoming as absolute reality, because this severe
man evoked visions of a Heraclitean world. At the same time, Nietzsche
wished not to revel in imagery and visions but to conduct an experiment
in radical nominalism. His interest in nominalism was already apparent
in his essay "On Truth and Falsehood," in which he called truth a
"mobile army of metaphors" (1,880; TF). Now, with the encouragement
of Spir, he was developing this nominalist critique. What is language? It
is our house of being, but this house is situated within a vast hushed
expanse. By introducing nominalism, Nietzsche was taking leave of the
fantastic claim to invincibility of a philosophy that failed to differentiate
sufficiendy between being and its expression in language.^ ÉÉTo the extent
that human beings have believed in the concepts and names of things as
in external truths over long periods of time, they have acquired a pride
they have used to elevate themselves above the animals, in the firm belief
that in language they had knowledge of the world" (2,30; HHl § 11).
Humans base their actions on the proud awareness that they are also
capable of using their wodd of knowledge to "shake the very founda-
tions of the world as a whole" (2,30).
Does the opposite then apply once they have taken a nominalist
approach and seen through the world of knowledge they took to be
sound? Does everything now become fragile and uncertain? Does onto-
logical seasickness threaten a person who awakens from his dream of
knowledge and finds himself out on the ocean of enormous uncertain-
ties? How would reality appear if one were to attempt to undo the
"monstrous error" (2,31; HHl § 11)? One would then have to admit—
even if it were impossible to imagine—that there are no subjects,