The Bicameral System of Culture 183moral philosophy, then studied medicine and became a practicing doc-
tor back in his father's neighborhood. He led the life of a Tolstoyan; he
helped farmers and was considered an eccentric and a virtual saint.
When Nietzsche died, Rèe moved to the vicinity of Sils-Maria and pro-
vided medical care for the residents of the mountain region. One year
after Nietzsche's death, while hiking in the Alps, Rèe fell to his own
death from a slippery cliff. It is unclear whether it was an accident or sui-
cide. Shortly before his death, Rèe declared: "I have to philosophize.
When I run out of material about which to philosophize, it is best for
me to die" (Janz 1,644).
Even after the rift between them, Rèe wanted to dedicate his book
Die Entstehung des Gewissens (The Origin of Conscience, 1885), to his
former friend. Nietzsche, however, refused this gesture. Although he
never denied having been influenced by Rèe, he later adamandy empha-
sized his divergences from Rée's theoretical positions, going so far as to
claim in his preface to On the Genealogy of Morals that he had rarely read
something to which he felt so compelled to say no, "proposition by
proposition, conclusion by conclusion" (5,250; GM Preface § 4). He
concurred with Rée's critique of the metaphysical basis of morality, but
disputed his opinion that morality arises from the altruistic nature of
man. In Human, All Too Human, and even more in Daybreak, Nietzsche
followed the trail of morality back to its nonmoral basis. The history of
morality is not moral. Moral feelings do not originate in virtue, but
result from a very long history of cultural habits and ingrained attitudes
that come to the surface. The physiological dimension is also important.
People who act morally may consider themselves moral, but in reality,
Nietzsche explained, it is this history of the body and culture that is
"acting" within us. How does it "act"? First and foremost by splitting
people apart. As Nietzsche wrote in Human, All Too Human, morality
presupposes a capability for "self-splitting" (2,76; HH I § 57).
Something within us gives orders to another something within us.
Conscience, incessant self-commentary, and self-evaluation come into
play. Although a powerful tradition focused on the "individual," the