The Bicameral System of Culture 185search in vain for an authority bold enough to give commands.
Internalized commands have not only fractured the individual but awak-
ened self-doubt. This complicated history eventually gave rise to some-
thing that later centuries would call the depth of soul, this whole inner
labyrinth of veiled meaning, profundity, and nonsense.
Nietzsche knew that the "dividual" way of life was now inevitable.
The path back to prehistoric harmony within individuals—if it ever
existed at all—had been closed off. A basic breach and inner disjunc-
tions have become part of the conditio humana
Nonetheless, Nietzsche would continue to insist that we "make a
whole person of ourselves" (2,92; HHl § 95). This quest for wholeness
would not entail overcoming the dividual mode of existence, which
would be impossible, but effective self-configuration and self-instru-
mentation. We need to take charge of our impulses, learn to smooth
over our disjunctions, and become the conductor of our medley of
voices. The ominous "will to power"—which, as we will see later, builds
up to a cosmic explanation and directive of grand-scale politics in
Nietzsche's later years—is always tuned to a concert pitch, and signifies
a quest for self-empowerment. Nietzsche's works as a whole are an
extended chronicle of the complex events in an experiment to attain
power over oneself. Let us here recall Nietzsche's moral imperative:
"You should become the master of yourself and also the master of your
own virtues. Previously, they were your masters, but they must be noth-
ing more than your tools, just some tools among others. You should
achieve power over your pros and cons and learn how to put them forth
and hang them back in accordance with your higher aim. You should
learn to recognize the perspectivism inherent in every appraisal" (2,20;
HHl Preface § 6). The relationship to oneself that is here envisaged is
one of sovereignty in which "bourgeois morality no longer has a say,"
because it demands reliability, steadiness, and predictability. Nietzsche
felt that making "a whole person of ourselves" was the loftiest task that
any individual could achieve in a lifetime. This type of issue does not
ensue from the history of morality, in which nothing matters less than