The Bicameral System of Culture 187vulnerability by arousing pity. In this way, sufferers have found a means
of "inflicting pain" (2,71; HHl § 50) on others.
Nietzsche sought to strip the dialectics of pity—in which the sufferer
inflicts pain on others by arousing pity—of its sentimental coating,
thereby revealing the power struggle beneath the surface. In his view, the
dialectics of pity impelled the batde between master and servant When
a person arouses pity, his "conceit rises up; he is still important enough
to cause pain to the world" (2J\;HHl § 50). At the same time, the per-
son experiencing pity feels wronged and trapped, although he may oth-
erwise be the master.
Gratitude presents another example of the insignificance of morals
and reveals how much undedying struggle is involved. Nietzsche con-
tended that gratitude is a mild form of revenge. A person on the receiv-
ing end of an act of generosity is made aware of the power of his
benefactor. Although this power may be benevolent, it still makes one
individual beholden to another. The indebted individual expresses his
appreciation and repays his debt, perhaps even beyond the measure of
what was received. He then seeks to be free once more by inverting the
debtor relationship. Nietzsche recalled Swift's remark "that people are
grateful to the same extent that they harbor revenge" (2,67; HHl § 44).
Nietzsche's analysis of morality is positively obsessed with revealing
the primal cruelty that is masked in morality. Consequendy, for him,
open cruelty is the moment of truth. The primeval history of hostility
comes to light, and elemental forces break through the crust of civiliza-
tion. "We need to consider the people who are now cruel as stages of ear-
lier cultures that have been left over: the mountains of humanity are
openly revealing the deeper formations here that otherwise remain con-
cealed" (2,66; HH I § 43).
In Daybreak, Nietzsche further advanced his analysis of the cruelty
that constitutes the basis of human interaction. He described the ways
in which "refined cruelty" (3,40; D § 30) could become an acknowledged
virtue. When someone is intent on excelling in an otherwise laudable
manner, does he not desire to "inflict pain" on others by means of his