188 Nietzscheexalted status and enjoy the envy he arouses? Is there not an "anticipated
delight" (3,40) in an artist's ability to defeat his artistic rivals, which
heightens his euphoria in creation? Perhaps the agonistic character of
culture as a whole is really a sublimation of cruel readiness for batde.
What clandestine pleasures lurk behind the chastity of a nun? "With
what reproving eyes she looks into the face of women who live other-
wise! How much lust for revenge there is in these eyes!" (3,40; D § 30).
Nietzsche found ample evidence in religion to support his hypothe-
sis that cruelty was a creative force in civilization. In many cultures, the
gods were held to be cruel, and required mollification in the form of sac-
rifices. People obviously pictured the gods as creatures who took pleas-
ure in witnessing torture and carnage. Even the Christian God had to be
placated by the sacrifice of his son. Gratifying the gods entails provid-
ing them a festival of cruelty. Their pleasure is a magnified version of
the pleasure of humans; hence "cruelty is one of the oldest festive joys
of mankind" (3,30; £>§ 18).
When Nietzsche called the history of moral feelings the "history of
an error" (2,63; HH I § 39), he was not denying that this error had
shaped culture. Moral feelings are certainly in error if they purport to be
an organ of truth and a guide to the true destiny of man, but errors of
this sort are necessary illusions that make possible man's cultural self-
definition. However oppressive moral laws may be, they do yield
extraordinary self-esteem. Let us consider, for example, the taboo
against incest. There is no natural reason, in terms of either instinct or
physiology, not to violate this taboo. The boundary that precludes inces-
tuous relations is not physical but moral. Obedience ultimately evolves
into self-control, which signals our initiation into culture. Only those
who exercise self-control can learn self-regard.
Cultural commandments and proscriptions serve practical ends that
are eugenic, economic, health-related, and political. Nietzsche, however,
warned us against projecting a utilitarian purpose back onto origins,
since a purpose often emerges only much later. The same applies to self-
control, which was not designed as a pedagogical program but was