200 Nietzscheaside to reveal his thoughts beyond what he articulates to the other char-
acters, Nietzsche divulged the transitional nature of his reflections. His
anxiety as to how far we can go along with the spirit of science without
winding up in a desert comes through on several occasions. Scientific
curiosity is initially refreshing, enlivening, and liberating, but truths turn
gloomy once we have become accustomed to them. IÇ however, science
affords us less and less pleasure and at the same time takes our pleasure
away "by casting suspicion on the solace offered by metaphysics, reli-
gion, and art, then the greatest source of pleasure to which mankind
owes almost all of its humanity is impoverished" (2,209; HHI § 251).
Nietzsche was already starting to revolve the stage here once again.
The metaphysical magic of art and a Dionysian and tragic sensibility
were almost poised to reappear—but only almost Nietzsche did not
complete the revolution; instead, he stopped short with an astonishing
suggestion for compromise that one would hardly expect of him given
his detachment from a technological approach to culture (which would
explain why so few readers have picked up on it). He argued for a bicam-
eral system of culture. A higher culture must give people "two chambers
of the brain, as it were, one to experience science and the other non-
science: lying juxtaposed, without confusion, divisible, able to be sealed
off; this is necessary to preserve health. The source of power is located
in the one region; the regulator, in the other. Illusions, partialities, and
passions must provide the heat, while the deleterious and dangerous
consequences of overheating must be averted with the aid of scientific
knowledge" (2,209; HHI § 251).
The idea of a bicameral system flashes up again and again in
Nietzsche's work and then vanishes, much to the detriment of his phi-
losophy. If he had held to it, he might well have spared himself some of
his mad visions of grand politics and the will to power.