208 Nietzsche
Even the Kantian "thing in itself" which Nietzsche had subjected to
such ridicule as a nonconcept for the nonapparent, is still a phenome-
non since it is something that is thought
Nietzsche had no intention of reviving artificial solipsistic doubts
about the reality of the external world. On the contrary, he regarded the
inner wodd as an internalized outer wodd that is only revealed to us as
a phenomenon- As a result, the monstrous forces outside of us reside
within us as well. Consciousness itself, however, is neither inside nor
outside, but somewhere in-between. It is always alongside of what it is
conscious of. If it is consciousness of that tree out there, it is "out
there." If it is consciousness of pain, or desire, it is inside where the pain
and desire originate. Nietzsche hoped to heighten our awareness and
attention, guided by the insight "that all our so-called consciousness is a
more or less fanciful commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknow-
able, but felt, text" (3,113; D § 119).
What is consciousness? It is not an empty mirror, nor is it an empty
container in need of replenishment Consciousness is filled with the
being that is itself consciousness. Consciousness is the being that is con-
scious of itself It is therefore not the sum total of being, but by the
same token it does not amount to less than being. Consciousness is not
a discrete entity, but each time we fall asleep it experiences the mystery
of the transition from existence that is conscious to existence devoid of
consciousness. Consciousness is aware of these vast boundaries. It fills
its void not with "objects" but always in reference to something. It is this
referentiality itself and the "self" of this referentiality. Consciousness
has no "within," but rather is the "outside" of itself If we dig down
deeply enough into our consciousness, we suddenly find ourselves back
at the things outside; we are actually flung back to them. Nietzsche
depicts acts of consciousness as arising from a "hunger" (3,112; D §
119). Phenomenologists, for whom Nietzsche paved the way with his
analyses of consciousness, use the terms "intention" or "the intentional
structure of consciousness" in this context
A series of types of intentions corresponds to the various types of