214 Nietzsche
volition, memory, and even thinking could also take place without any
accompanying mirroring and self-reference. They have no absolute need
to enter into consciousness to realize their full meaning. Even con-
sciousness need not enter into consciousness; its self-doubling is not
structurally imperative. In short: "All of life would be possible without,
as it were, seeing itself in a mirror; as in actuality even now the major
part of our life unfolds without this kind of mirroring" (3,590; GS §
354).
Why have a consciousness, then, if it is by and large "superfluous"?
Nietzsche contended that consciousness is the sphere of the in-
between. The human network is a system of communication, and
consciousness is a means of surmounting the individual by means of
integration into this structure of communication. "Consciousness is
actually only a network to connect one person to another" (3,591; Ci §
354). Within this network, language functions as a set of "communica-
tive signs." There are, of course, additional communicative signs, such
as facial expressions, gestures, the use of objects, and an entire symbolic
universe in which communication takes place. Nietzsche concluded "that
consciousness does not really belong to individual human existence, but
rather to aspects of man's social and herd nature" (3,592; GS§ 354). The
individual is hardly in a position to "understand" his unique qualities
with the aid of this communalized consciousness. Consciousness
does not serve that end. It promotes circulation rather than self-
comprehension; if it is used toward the latter end anyway, we should not
be surprised if man ends up eluding his own grasp. The inexpressible
that we ourselves are is not addressed by this network of language and
consciousness of socialization. Nietzsche reminds us that we have all
had the experience of attempting to know ourselves and finding that we
bring "only the specifically nonindividual into our consciousness"
(3,592).
Here again, Nietzsche revealed himself as a nominalist by applying
the inexpressible absolute singularity of God to the individual. The indi-
vidual is just as inexhaustible and inexpressible as God once was. The