Eternal Recurrence and The Cay Science 241this perspective. When new knowledge enters the picture, a "vortex"
throws the usual and accustomed truths into question. This situation
remains relatively benign as long as it stays on the level of purely intel-
lectual uncertainty and innovations. But when it becomes the kind of
knowledge that intrudes on the life and customs of a culture, and when
people have the incorporated aspects of previous knowledge to contend
with, a struggle arises for a new incorporation. In the process, the new
insights can be regarded as "madness" (3,431 ; GS§ 76) and face adamant
opposition because they blatandy challenge the conditions of life of an
entire culture without offering an appealing alternative or being strong
enough to accomplish incorporation on their own. Thus, incorporation
implies that the truth of truth is its strength to render itself true. Truth
is confirmed in the process of incorporation.
Nietzsche was thus disputing an idea he had advanced elsewhere con-
cerning the dualism of knowledge and life, namely that knowledge
stems from an instinctual basis and turns powerful when combined with
instinctual bases. He explained "that it is certainly wrong to deny the
power of instincts in knowledge and" to believe "that reason is an alto-
gether free activity that is generated from within" (3,470; Gi§ 110).
The instinctual basis of knowledge is undeniable, which does not
change the fact that this proposition concerning the power of instincts
lays claim to a validity that is independent of instincts. If the proposi-
tion were only an expression of an instinct, it would not be true; but if
it were not true, it would not be the expression of an instinct, which is
what the proposition is claiming. This proposition, just like any other
proposition that lays claim to a validity of truth, would fall into an abyss
and be meaningless. There must therefore be a criterion for truth that
involves something other than instinctual bases.
Nietzsche would wander despairingly through this labyrinth of self-
referentialities, sometimes laughing and ironic, teetering between
prophet and clown. In the end, it was perhaps his breakdown that
offered him a way out of the house of mirrors of his theories. But let us
keep in mind that, in this whole confusion about the question of truth,