14 INTRODUCTION
would include most of ancient Platonism, of course. But if we
add the adjective "biblical," to denote "demiurgical" traditions
that also incorporate or adapt traditions from Jewish or Christ-
ian Scripture, the category is narrowed significantly. In fact, the
category "biblical demiurgical" would include a large percentage
of the sources that today are usually called "gnostic," since the
distinction between the creator(s) of the cosmos and the true God
is normally identified as a common feature of gnosticism."^11Rethinking "Gnosticism" is one of the more thought-provoking books to
have appeared in the past several years on the topic of the definition of gnosis
and gnosticism. In spite of Williams's argument, however, in this volume we
shall continue to use the term gnostic. We do so for three reasons.
First, Williams concedes, as we have seen above, that Bentley Layton has
brought some clarity to the discussion of what is gnostic, and he acknowl-
edges with Layton that there are in fact connections among gnostic texts. The
savvy of scholars from the time of the Messina colloquium and Hans Jonas to
the present day is vindicated in the continual use of the terms gnosis, gnosti-
cism, and gnostic, though now with important qualifications. We too shall
continue to make use of these terms.
Second, Williams stresses the widespread diversity within the category
gnosticism, and of course he is correct in doing so. Yet his recognition of gnos-
tic diversity merely parallels the similar recognition by scholars of diversity in
Judaism and Christianity. This recognition of diversity has led Jacob Neusner
to suggest "Judaisms" and Jonathan Z. Smith "Christianities" as appropriate
terms for these diverse religious movements. Perhaps we might also opt for
"gnosticisms" or "gnostic religions" as a similar way of acknowledging the dif-
ferences among religions of gnosis.
Third, we continue to use the terms gnosis, gnosticism, and gnostic with a
particular understanding of comparison and classification. In Drudgery Di-
vine, Jonathan Z. Smith reminds us that comparisons do not necessarily tell us
how things actually are as much as they tell us about the people doing the
comparisons and their assumptions and perspectives. Smith notes that state-
ments of comparison are triadic, with an implicit "more than" and an addi-
tional "with respect to." Thus, A resembles B more than C with respect to N.
- Ibid., pp. 51-52.