Religion and Political Behavior 301
in engagement in political life by religious organizations (what is sometimes referred to
as the “privatization” thesis).^4 These secularization processes imply different things for
political behavior. The first suggests individual-level change: As education levels and
general societal affluence increase, voters may become less reliant on simple religious
heuristics to govern all aspects of their lives, including how they vote (e.g., Dalton 1988,
1990; Inglehart 1990; Dogan 1995). The second and third suggests organizational-level
change: As church attendance declines or religious organizations lose members (in
absolute or relative terms), the capacity of churches to influence elections and the shape
of political debates can be expected to decline (e.g., Wallis and Bruce 1992). Similarly, if
churches become less involved in worldly affairs, their capacity to influence the voting
behavior of members will likely decline.
The secularization thesis has been widely debated (see, for example, Chapters 5, 8,
and 9, this volume), and we cannot take up all of its implications in relation to politi-
cal behavior here. Evidence of declining levels of religious voting would be consistent
with a secularization thesis. Yet correlation is not causation, and we cannot assume
that declining religious voting is necessarily the result of the declining religious com-
mitments of individuals, the declining aggregate strength of religious beliefs, or the
declining influence of religious organizations, in the absence of other information. For
example, changes in party systems (such as the merging of religious and nonreligious
parties into new officially secular parties), or the changing shape of national or local
issue agendas (such as the declining salience of a particular issue) can sometimes have
dramatic and independent impacts on the levels of religious voting independent of
secularization processes (Van Kersbergen 1999).
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES:
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM?
Viewed from a comparative perspective, the United States has long appeared excep-
tional in the degree and level of religiosity found among its citizens (Greeley 1991;
Tiryakian 1993). Foreign observers – including most famously de Tocqueville and
Weber – have long reported evidence of unusually high levels of religiosity in defi-
ance of Enlightenment theories of religious decline. Post–World War II survey data
appear to confirm that, when contrasted with other comparable developed capitalist
democracies, religiosity among U.S. citizens appears unusually high. Americans rou-
tinely claim higher levels of church membership and attendance at religious services,
are more likely to believe in God, and to claim that religion is of considerable impor-
tance in their lives, than citizens in other postindustrial capitalist democracies (Wald
1996: Chapter 1). They are much more likely to hold fundamentalist beliefs, such as
God performing miracles (a belief held by 80 percent of Americans) (Lipset 1996: 61).
The evidence also suggests little or no decline in religious affiliation or belief in the post–
World War II period, and overall, higher levels of religious participation in the twentieth
than in the nineteenth century (cf. Finke and Stark 1992; Lipset 1996: 62). American
political leaders of both major parties now routinely declare their devotion to God.
(^4) For sophisticated overviews of the secularization model, see especially Casanova (1994) and
Yamane (1997). The most plausible contemporary defenses of the model would include Chaves
(1994), Yamane (1997), and Wallis and Bruce (1992).