310 Jeff Manza and Nathan Wright
complex set of historical processes triggered by two revolutions, a “national” revolution
and an “industrial” revolution. The resulting social divisions produced by these twin
revolutions were viewed as having produced stable patterns of group-based political
conflict, expressed through modern party systems. The most important of these cleav-
ages included those based on class divisions (triggered by the industrial revolution),
religion, ethnicity, and language (triggered by the national revolution). The precise ar-
ticulation and relative magnitude of each of these cleavages varied from country to
country, often depending on the sequencing of party formation and democratization
(cf. Mann 1993). In some countries, a religious cleavage came to be embedded in the
party system, through the formation of political parties with strong ties to dominant
religious institutions.
The European religious landscape also varies. Three distinct patterns of religious
identity can be found in Western Europe: Countries that are mostly Catholic (e.g.,
Italy, Ireland, France, Austria, Belgium, Spain); countries that are mostly Protestant (in
particular the Scandinavian countries, but also Britain); and countries with more equal
proportions of Protestants and Catholics (Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland). The
magnitude and form of the religious cleavages found in different countries can be
expected to vary depending on the structure of the religious field (cf. Dalton 1988,
1990). For example, analysts generally find that Catholic countries, religiously divided
countries, or countries without a state church, have higher levels of religious division
in voting behavior than countries with a state-sanctioned church which claims the
allegiance of most citizens.^7 But important exceptions also have been noted: Levels of
religious voting in Britain have sometimes been said to be as large as those of class
divisions (cf. Miller and Raab 1977; Rogowski 1981), and among the Scandinavian
countries (with state churches) religious-based political divisions also can be found
(Stephens 1979).
Finally, and again in contrast to the United States, arguments about the importance
of secularization processes in the European context have long and repeatedly been as-
serted. Economic prosperity and rising levels of educational attainment have long been
viewed as factors eroding religious cues for voting behavior (see, e.g., Baker, Dalton, and
Hildebrandt [1975] on West Germany; Sundberg and Berglund [1984] on the Scandi-
navian countries; Eisenga, Felling, and Lammers [1994] on the Netherlands; and the
various country-specific studies in Franklin, Mackie, and Valen [1992]). Other analysts
have argued that the decline in church attendance across many European countries is
weakening the salience of religion for voters (see, e.g., Books [1980] on Italy and West
Germany; Mendras [1991] on France; and comparatively on a number of countries,
Dogan [1995]).
Macro Factors: The Fate of Religious Parties
Most significant religious parties in European polities are located on the center-right
of the political spectrum, and are usually known as Christian Democratic parties (for
overviews, see Berger 1982; Hanley 1994; Lane and Erson 1994; Gallagher, Laver, and
(^7) This point can be related to the larger finding in sociology, by now well established, that
religious pluralism leads to higher levels of religious practice, belief, and salience than are
found under conditions of religious monopoly (Warner 1993; Stark and Finke 2000).