The Evolution of the Sociology of Religion 69
(Warner 1997: 194–6): namely, the European origins of the secularization thesis as
opposed to the American genesis of the new paradigm. The beginnings of the two
models go back centuries rather than decades. To be more precise, the secularization
thesis finds its roots in medieval Europe some eight hundred years ago. The key element
is the existence of a monopoly church with authority over the whole society; both
church and authority are kept in place by a series of formal and informal sanctions. It
is, moreover, the monopoly itself that provides the plausibility structure – the authority
is not only unquestioned, but unquestionable. Given the inseparability of monopoly
and plausibility, the latter will inevitably be undermined by increasing ideological and
cultural pluralism, a relentless process with multiple causes. Documenting this process,
or gradual undermining, is a central task of sociologists, who quite correctly describe
their subject matter (a metanarrative) as the process of secularization.
The alternative paradigm, or metanarrative, begins rather later – say, two hundred
rather than eight hundred years ago and in the new world not the old, to be more
precise in the early years of the United States as an independent nation. Here there was
no monopoly embodied in a state church, simply a quasi-public social space that no
single group could dominate. All kinds of different groups or denominations emerged
to fill this space, each of them utilizing particular religious markers as badges of identity
(religion was much more important in this respect than social class). Simply surviving
required considerable investment of time, talent, and money, not least to attract suffi-
cient others to one’s cause in face of strong competition. The possibilities of choice were
endless, and choice implies rejection as well as acceptance. The affinities with modern-
day America are immediately apparent, a situation admirably described in Ammerman’s
Congregations and Community(Ammerman 1997a). Such a book could not have been
written about Europe.
Interestingly, as Warner himself makes clear, the classics can be drawn on in both sit-
uations, although in rather different ways. Identities, for example, can be constructed
in Durkheimian terms in relation to the whole society (in Europe) or to a particular
community within this (in the United States). Likewise, Protestant sects can be seen
as undermining a European monopoly or, rather more positively, as competitors in
an American market – either way, Weber’s insights are helpful. Conversely, attempts to
impose either the secularization or the rational choice (religious economies) paradigm
wholesale on to the alternative context really do cause trouble. Such attempts arise
from a conviction that one paradigm, and only one, must be right in all circumstances.
That, in my view, is mistaken. Which is not to say that elements of each approach can-
not be used to enlighten certain aspects of the alternative situation – clearly, that can
be done and to considerable effect. A useful illustration of positive application can be
found, for instance, in Hamberg and Pettersson’s (1994) testing of the rational choice
hypothesis in different regions of Sweden. More precisely, the authors investigate the
effect of pluralism on religious activity in Sweden. Their findings support the ratio-
nal choice approach and in one of the most religiously homogeneous societies of
Europe.
The crucial point to grasp, however, lies very much deeper and illustrates, once
again, the essential difference between Europe and the United States in terms of re-
ligious understandings. More specifically, it lies in the fact that Europeans, as a con-
sequence of the state church system (an historical fact whether you like it or not)
regard their churches as public utilities rather than competing firms. That is the real