DISPOSITIONS FOR COOPERATION
Why do we have this specific domain of understanding, these spe-
cific capacities for moral judgements and feelings? When we see
that young children quickly grasp some complex distinctions, in the
face of fragmented and often incoherent messages from their envi-
ronment, it makes sense to wonder whether they have special dispo-
sitions for paying attention to particular cues in the environment
and for deriving particular conclusions from these cues. In other
domains we have seen that early principles make learning possible
and that this is certainly a consequence of evolution. We have spe- [181]
cific dispositions for learning specific kinds of animal concepts and
tool concepts. This is not too surprising in a species that depends
on interaction with animals for survival and has been in the business
of toolmaking for hundreds of thousands of years. But what about
moral dispositions?
It is tempting to think that social life imposescertain norms on indi-
viduals. Morality is seen as the opposite of our bestial nature, as it
were. We live in groups, which imposes certain limits on people's
behavior; living in groups is possible and advantageous only if individ-
uals are not completely opportunistic, if there is some restraint on
their pursuit of individual gain. So it would not seem too surprising
that we evolved moral dispositions that are beneficial to social groups.
Groups that are composed of people with such dispositions would
flourish, while groups of selfish opportunists would not be able to reap
the benefits of cooperation.
Unfortunately, stated in these terms the explanation is a non-
starter. To say that we have dispositions for a form of behavior is to
say that particular genetic traits lead, given the appropriate environ-
ment, to that form of behavior. But genes always vary and always have
varied. This is what makes evolution possible in the first place. Some
variants give their bearers better chances to pass on their genes, so
these variants spread in the gene pool. Other variants reduce these
chances and therefore tend to disappear. If we had dispositions for
socially acceptable behavior, these should vary too. What would hap-
pen then? Some people would have stronger dispositions and become
selfless individuals who sacrifice their immediate benefits on the altar
of group prosperity. Others would have much weaker dispositions
and would take every opportunity to thrive at the expense of others
and of the group. The "cheaters" would have no problem surviving
WHYDOGODS ANDSPIRITSMATTER?