two-dimensional information on the retina into a possible three-
dimensional representation; another evaluates the respective distances
of objects seen; a third handles their color; a fourth sends information
to a database of common shapes for identification, etc. (I am simplify-
ing a great deal: for instance, metric properties are not handled by the
same system as the relative positions of objects, and small details of
objects are probably treated separately from global shapes.)
One might expect that there is a place in the brain where all this
information is then collated to produce a little "mental picture" of
what you see. But there is no such place. The visual system persuades
[304] all the other systems in the brain that there is a tree and an elephant
out there without even making its case in a complete brief. It just
sends the appropriate information to the appropriate systems, and in
each case these systems just accept what the visual cortex is telling
them without considering the evidence.
So we have two quite different pictures of how a mind reaches a
verdict. On the one hand, we sometimes weigh evidence and decide
on its merit. On the other hand, there seems to be a great deal of
underground beliefmaking going on that is simply not reported.
When we discuss religious concepts and beliefs, we tend to assume
that these are processed in the mind along the lines of the first model,
a kind of Judge and Attorney system in the mind. We assume that
notions of supernatural agents, what they do, what they are like, etc.
are presented to the mind and that some decisionmaking process
accepts these notions as valid or rejects them. But this may be a rather
distorted view of how such concepts are acquired and represented.
SIMPLE BELIEFS IN A COMPLEX MIND
What happens in a mind to produce beliefs? To get a better idea of
that, it may be of help to leave aside the emotionally charged domain
of religion and consider humble beliefs that we all share. For
instance, most of us usually assume that children are less capable than
adults, that their mental equipment is not yet fully developed. Why
do we find this idea so natural? There are many situations where the
child's immaturity seems obvious to us. When we utter simple sen-
tences, infants do not seem to understand them. Even once they
speak the language fluently, young children do not seem to get jokes.
We have moral intuitions and many young children seem incapable ofRELIGION EXPLAINED