REFERENCES
Anderson, D. N. (1988). The delusion of inanimate doubles: Implications for
understanding the Capgras phenomenon.British Journal of Psychiatry,153, 694–699.
Anttonen, V. (2000). Sacred. In W. Braun and R. McCutcheon (eds.),Guide to the
study of religion(pp. 271–282). London and New York: Cassell.
Argyle, M. (1990). The psychological explanation of religious experience. Psyke &
Logos,11(2), 267–274.
Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193(5),
31 – 35.
Atran, S. (1990). Cognitive foundations of natural history: Towards an anthropology of
science.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
. (1994). Core domains versus scientific theories: Evidence from systemat-
ics and Itza-Maya folkbiology. In L. A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman (eds.),Mapping
themind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture(pp. 316–340). New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
. (1996). From folk biology to scientific biology. In D. R. Olson and N.
Torrance (eds.), The handbook of education and human development: New models of learn-
ing, teaching and schooling(pp. 646–682). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
_____. (1998). Folk biology and the anthropology of science: Cognitive univer-
sals and cultural particulars.Behavioral & Brain Sciences,21(4), 547–609.
Bacharach, M., and D. Gambetta. (1999). Trust in signs. In K. Cook (ed.), Trust
and social structure. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Barkow, J., L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby (eds). (1992).The adapted mind: Evolutionary
psychology and the generation of culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cam-
bridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Press.
Baron-Cohen, S., A. Leslie, and U. Frith. (1985). Does the autistic child have a
'theory of mind'? Cognition,21, 37–46.
Barrett, H. C. (1999). Human cognitive adaptations to predators and prey. Doc-
toral dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara.
[343]