tool templates. Psychologist Tom Ward used simple experiments to
illustrate this point, asking people to draw and describe imaginary
animals. He allowed them to make up any odd features they wanted.
The results are indeed strange but it is remarkable how most sub-
jects' creations abide by implicit principles about animal body-plans.
For instance, they all preserve bilateral symmetry; people invent
ten-legged animals, but they are sure to put five legs on each side.
Also, the animals move in the direction of their sense organs; if they
have ten eyes, they have at least two in the front. So apparently
unconstrained fantasy cannot easily break free of intuitive expecta-
[62] tions. The general point is not new. Indeed, philosophers such as
Immanuel Kant argued that the structure of ordinary concepts pro-
vides the backbone for apparently unconstrained flights of imagina-
tion. What is new, on the other hand, is that we now have a much
better description of how ordinary concepts give structure to fanci-
ful ones.^2
This applies to religious concepts as well. Religious representations
are particular combinations of mental representations that satisfy two
conditions. First, the religious concepts violate certain expectations
from ontological categories. Second, they preserve other expectations.
All this will become quite clear if we return to some examples of possi-
ble though unfamiliar religious notions:
(35) Some ebony trees can recall conversations people hold in their
shade.
(32) There are invisible people around who drink cologne. If someone
suddenly goes into a fit and screams for cologne, they are being
possessed by one of these invisible people.Note that the sentences above describe particular kinds of more gen-
eralcategories. That is, (35) is not just about ebony trees; it is also a
description of a PLANT with special characteristics. And (32) is about
persons with special characteristics. The plants described in (35) differ
from other kinds of plants, and the persons in (32) are distinct from
other kinds of persons. This is generally true of religious concepts.
They (more or less clearly) describe a new object by giving (i) its onto-
logical category and (ii) its special features, different from other
objects in the same ontological category. To use the same kind of dia-
gram as before, this is how one can build a minimal representation of
the special ebony trees:RELIGION EXPLAINED