jonna bornemark & hans ruinthe messianic in Judaism. This idea has two sides. It is both a fanatic
idea of Judgment Day and an idea of history as open-ended. Drawing
on Levinas she focuses on the temporality inherent in messianism: an
analysis that shows that the self is never entirely present to itself, but
must be understood as a promise of a future, and as a call for respon-
sibility for its immemorial past. This idea of a critical messianism can
contribute to the contemporary debate on religion, and one way of
taking responsibility for the past is to struggle to restore previously
unheard voices. The futural aspect of religion also shows that a tradi-
tion, in its promise to respond, does not already have a fixed answer,
but always tries to answer anew.
This openness of religion is the theme of Arne Grøn’s article. He
claims that religion is about transformation and about seeing differ-
ently, and thus seeing beyond the obvious through taking the world
differently. Grøn states that our seeing is always limited, and always
has its horizon. The investigation of transcendence and the meaning
of a “beyond,” thus, has to be an investigation into the horizon-
tal — which at the same time implies the limiting and the opening up
of sight. The horizon constitutes our immanence, what is given to us,
and the investigation of this immanence emphasizes the passivity and
alterity that is involved in “having” a horizon. The theme of horizon
opens up the question of immanence, and shows transcendence and
immanence as problematic and intertwined concepts. In the prob-
lematization of these concepts he suggests that philosophy can be chal-
lenged by religion as a human concern.
The question of “beyond” is discussed in another way by Marcia Sá
Cavalcante Schuback, in a contribution that focuses on the phenom-
enon of immensity; the hugeness of the world as the experience of the
“too big”, that is, of a beyond-within measures and limits. She proposes
that the discussions of the immensity of the world could make it
possible to establish a common ground to discuss the relation between
phenomenology and religion. Such a common ground would be a “be-
fore” the split between religion and philosophy, not in a chronological
sense, but as the awakening of a certain feeling and attitude that pre-
cedes the distinction between phenomenology and religion. She thus
develops a sensitivity to immensity as the creative shadow of the un-
controllable and incalculable.